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"Torture is prohibited by law throughout the United States.
It is categorically denounced as a matter of policy and as a tool
of state authority. Every act constituting torture under the [Con-
vention Against Torture] constitutes a criminal offense under
the law of the United States. No official of the government, fed-
eral, state or local, civilian or military, is authorized to commit
or to instruct anyone else to commit torture. Nor may any offi-
cial condone or tolerate torture in any form. No exceptional cir-
cumstances may be invoked as a justification of torture. U.S.
law contains no provision permitting otherwise prohibited acts
of torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment to be employed on grounds of exigent circumstances
(for example, during a 'state of public emergency') .... 1
"[Tihe methods of police interrogation which are employed
in any given regime are a faithful mirror of the character of the
entire regime .... [Aill the more so with respect to the interroga-
tion methods of a security service, which is always in danger of
t Associate Professor and Vance K. Opperman Research Scholar, Uni-
versity of Minnesota Law School. Parts of this Article were presented at
"Speaking Law to Power," a symposium organized by the University of Minne-
sota's Law and Inequality, and the constitutional law colloquium at George-
town University Law Center. I wish to thank all participants for helpful com-
ments. I owe special thanks to Brian Bix, Richard Fallon, Barry Feld, Richard
Frase, Sanford Levinson, Fionnuala Ni AolAin, and Michael Tonry for helpful
insights and suggestions and to the editors of the Minnesota Law Review for
their assistance in getting this Article to print. Copyright © 2004 Oren Gross.
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sliding towards methods practiced in regimes which we abhor."2
"Purity is an idea for a yogi or a monk. You intellectuals
and bourgeois anarchists use it as a pretext for doing nothing.
To do nothing, to remain motionless, arms at your sides, wear-
ing kid gloves. Well, I have dirty hands. Right up to the el-
bows .... But what do you hope? Do you think you can govern
innocently?"'
"I'm a lawyer, ... but if it were my daughter on that bus, I'd
want them to beat.., a suspect to stop it."4
INTRODUCTION
Writing during the early days of the Cold War, Carl Frie-
drich, a Harvard University professor of political science, de-
scribed the tension between national security and civil rights
and liberties as arising "wherever a constitutional order of the
libertarian kind has been confronted with the Communist chal-
lenge, and with the Fascist response to that challenge."' The
collapse of the Communist regimes of Eastern Europe seemed
to assign this description to the history pages. Yet, while Com-
munism no longer excites our imagination as a credible threat,
terrorism does. And so Friedrich's dilemma still remains valid
today, albeit in a somewhat different format: Should a democ-
ratic regime that is confronted with a serious terrorist chal-
lenge respond to that threat with countermeasures, which
while potentially efficient in overcoming the specific dangers at
hand, run contrary to the very notion of a democratic order?6
The tension between self-preservation and defending the "in-
2. ISRAELI GOV'T PRESS OFFICE, COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO THE
METHODS OF INVESTIGATION OF THE GENERAL SECURITY SERVICE REGARDING
HOSTILE TERRORIST ACTITY 76 (1987), reprinted in 23 ISR. L. REV. 146, 182
(1989) [hereinafter Landau Report].
3. JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, DIRTY HANDS, reprinted in No EXIT AND THREE
OTHER PLAYS 125, 218 (I. Abel trans., Vintage Intl ed. 1989).
4. Storer H. Rowley, Israel Debates Beating Terror Suspects, CHI. TRIB.,
Sept. 3, 1995, at C24 (quoting an Israeli government official speaking after a
series of homicide bus bombings in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv).
5. CARL J. FRIEDRICH, CONSTITUTIONAL REASON OF STATE 13 (1957).
6. This dilemma was famously captured by President Lincoln's rhetorical
question: "are all the laws, but one, to go unexecuted, and the government it-
self go to pieces, lest that one be violated?" Abraham Lincoln, Message to Con-
gress in Special Session (July 4, 1861), in 4 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF
ABRAHAM LINCOLN 421, 430 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953).
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ner-most self' of the democratic regime-those attributes that
make the regime worth defending-presents decision makers
with tragic choices.7 This Article explores one such tragic
choice, involving one type of "Fascist response," namely the use
of torture in interrogations of suspected terrorists.
The traditional story about torture goes something like
this: Since the nineteenth century, Western societies have con-
sidered torture as "the supreme enemy of humanitarian juris-
prudence and of liberalism, and the greatest threat to law and
reason."8 To the extent that torture continues, it is confined to
authoritarian regimes. Reflecting strong universal condemna-
tion and reprobation of such practices, torture is absolutely
prohibited under all major international human rights and
humanitarian law conventions. 9 This absolute ban is considered
universal and has become part of customary international law.
In fact, it amounts to a preemptory norm of international law.10
7. FRIEDRICH, supra note 5, at 13 (noting that the survival of a constitu-
tional order involves more than self-preservation due to the rational and spiri-
tual content of this order); see also Pnina Lahav, A Barrel Without Hoops: The
Impact of Counterterrorism on Israel's Legal Culture, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 529,
531 (1988) (noting the "tragic dimensions of the tension between terrorism,
counterterrorism, and justice in any democratic society").
8. EDWARD PETERS, TORTURE 75 (expanded ed. 1996).
9. See, e.g., Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess.,
Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/708 (1984) (entered into force June 26,
1987); African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, June 27, 1981, art. 5,
OAU Doc. CABILEG/67/3/Rev. 5 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1986); American
Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, art. 5, 9 I.L.M. 673, 676-77,
O.A.S. Official Records OEA/ser. K/XVI/1.1, doc. 65, rev. 1, corr. 2 (entered into
force July 18, 1978); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec.
19, 1966, art. 7, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 175, 6 I.L.M. 368, 370; Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 3,
213 U.N.T.S. 221, 224 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953); see also Tomasi v.
France, 241 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), at 42 (1992) ("The requirements of the in-
vestigation and the undeniable difficulties inherent in the fight against crime,
particularly with regard to terrorism, cannot result in limits being placed on
the protection to be afforded in respect of the physical integrity of individu-
als."). Torture is also considered a grave breach of the four Geneva Conventions
for the Protection of Victims of War of 1949. Oren Gross, The Grave Breaches
System and the Armed Conflict in the Former Yugoslavia, 16 MICH. J. INTL L.
783, 801-09 (1995); see also M. Cherif Bassiouni & Daniel Derby, The Crime of
Torture, in 1 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 363 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed.,
1986); J. HERMAN BURGERS & HANS DANELIUS, THE UNITED NATIONS
CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE: A HANDBOOK ON THE CONVENTION AGAINST
TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUN-
ISHMENT (1988).
10. See, e.g., Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 243 (2d Cir. 1995) (noting
that official torture is prohibited under the norms of international law);
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In reality, this traditional story has always had a darker
side. For example, while outlawed in Europe, European nations
continued to employ torture in territories outside the conti-
nent." Numerous studies have shown that, far from being
eradicated, practices amounting to torture exist, to some de-
gree, in most countries around the world, including many de-
mocracies. 2 Yet the general perception remains: Torture is ex-
ercised on a systematic scale only by nondemocratic
governments, while its use in democratic regimes is, at most,
Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 717 (9th Cir. 1992)
(remarking that in light of the unanimity of international law, "it would be un-
thinkable to conclude other than that acts of official torture violate customary
international law"); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980)
(suggesting that torture violates international law to such an extent that the
"torturer has become-like the pirate and slave trader before him-hostis hu-
mani generis, an enemy of all mankind"); Council of Europe, Guidelines on
Human Rights and the Fight Against Terrorism (2002); Inter-American Com-
mission on Human Rights, Report on the Situation of Human Rights of Asy-
lum Seekers Within the Canadian Refugee Determination System,
OEA/Ser.LIVIII.106, Doc. 40 rev., Feb. 28, 2000, at § 118; RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, § 702, cmt.
n (1990); Roland Bank, International Efforts to Combat Torture and Inhuman
Treatment: Have the New Mechanisms Improved Protection?, 8 EUR. J. INTL L.
613 (1997); Sanford Levinson, "Precommitment" and "Postcommitment: The
Ban on Torture in the Wake of September 11, 81 TEX. L. REV. 2013, 2013-17
(2003); see also SISSELA BOK, COMMON VALUES 15-16 (1995) (refraining from
coercion and violence as values common across cultures); Seth F. Kreimer, Ex-
ploring the Dark Matter of Judicial Review: A Constitutional Census of the
1990s, 5 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 427, 510-11 (1997) (identifying the neces-
sity to limit the government's exercise of its power to harm or confine the per-
son of its citizens and the requirement of fair procedures as constituting "the
'dark matter' that holds our constitutional universe together"); Jeremy Wal-
dron, How To Argue for a Universal Claim, 30 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 305,
305 (1999) (explaining that torture is the most common example of "a form of
oppression which horrifies us and which we have reason to expect would hor-
rify anyone from any social or cultural background," and that it is therefore
not difficult "to argue from the standard, predictable abhorrence of torture in
every culture and every society to its condemnation as a universal moral evil").
11. See, e.g., MALCOLM D. EVANS & ROD MORGAN, PREVENTING TORTURE
27-32 (1998) (discussing the use of torture in the context of the Algerian War
of 1954-62); Ian Brownlie, Interrogation in Depth: The Compton and Parker
Reports, 35 MOD. L. REV. 501, 501 (1972) (discussing the use of "interrogation
in depth" techniques in British colonies and dominions such as Kenya, Cyprus,
Palestine, Aden, British Cameroon, and Malaya).
12. As Evans and Morgan rightly noted, "the temptation to use... forms
of coercion that might be judged to constitute torture lies at best only just be-
low the surface of everyday police and custodial practice." EVANS & MORGAN,
supra note 11, at x; see also Jerome H. Skolnick, American Interrogation: From
Torture to Trickery, in TORTURE (Sanford Levinson ed., forthcoming 2004)
(manuscript at 1, on file with author) (arguing that torture, disguised by other
labels, is a feature of America's heritage).
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aberrational. Occasionally we are shocked by revelations that
law enforcement agents or military personnel applied excessive
force in the context of interrogation of suspects. Usually the
government reassures us that such actions were not in any way
reflective of a general policy. From time to time such reassur-
ances are supported by disciplinary actions, and even criminal
charges, against the "deviant" officers. 3
This dissonance explains why discussion of certain ques-
tions, such as whether it can ever be legally or morally permis-
sible for a state to apply torture as an interrogation technique
to a person who possesses, but refuses to divulge, information
that can save the lives of a great number of innocent individu-
als, has been largely confined to academic writings in moral
and political philosophy as well as to discussions about the
hard choices facing the State of Israel in its fight against Pales-
tinian terrorism. 14 Yet many considered the Israeli situation to
be sui generis, a particular case that was inapplicable to the
experience of other democracies. However, the terrorist attacks
of September 11, 2001, and the subsequent war on terrorism
have added a new chapter to the story about torture. 5 The
question whether the use of torture may ever be justified or ex-
cused has become a matter of much public debate extending
beyond the boundaries of academic discussion. 16 Pandora's Box
has been opened. 7
13. See, e.g., U.S. Officer Charged for Harsh Interrogation Tactics, CNN,
(Dec. 13, 2003) (describing a $5000 fine imposed on Lt. Col. Allen West, the
commanding general of the 4th Infantry Division in Iraq, who was accused of
using improper methods to force information out of an Iraqi detainee), at
http://www.cnn.com/2003IUS/12/12/sprj.nirq.west.ruling/index.html.
14. For example, in 1989, the Israel Law Review published a collection of
essays discussing this topic. 23 ISR. L. REV. 192, 192-406 (1989).
15. Speaking of the structure of rights as fall-back, Jeremy Waldron sug-
gested that "in ordinary political arrangements between state and citizen, the
issue of torture simply does not arise .... [However,] people need this as
something to fall back on when normal politics collapse." Jeremy Waldron,
When Justice Replaces Affection: The Need for Rights, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'y 625, 643 (1988).
16. Representative examples are Mark Bowden, The Dark Art of Interro-
gation, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Oct. 2003, at 51; Vicki Haddock, The Unspeak-
able: To Get at the Truth, Is Torture or Coercion Ever Justified?, S.F. CHRON.,
Nov. 18, 2001, at D1; Is Torture Ever Justified?, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 11,
2003, at 9; Walter Pincus, Silence of 4 Terror Probe Suspects Poses Dilemma
for FBI, WASH. POST, Oct. 21, 2001, at A6; Eric Schmitt, There Are Ways To
Make Them Talk, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2002, at D1.
17. See Seth F. Kreimer, Too Close to the Rack and the Screw: Constitu-
tional Constraints on Torture in the War on Terror, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 278,
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In a recently published book, Why Terrorism Works,18 Har-
vard Law School Professor Alan Dershowitz, not one to shy
away from controversy, added his voice to the growing debate.
His arguments boil down to two important claims. First, he ar-
gues that there are circumstances when interrogation tech-
niques that amount to torture may be used. Under such cir-
cumstances the use of torture is both morally and legally
justified. 9 Despite recognizing that torture is an evil to be
avoided and prohibited, Dershowitz rejects the notion that such
a prohibition ought to be absolute. ° Second, in an attempt to
limit the use of torture and maximize civil liberties in the face
of a realistic likelihood that torture will, in fact, take place, he
suggests the mechanism of judicial torture warrants as prereq-
uisite to torturing suspected terrorists in interrogations.' It is
interesting to note that the concept of torture warrants was al-
ready invoked by Dershowitz and others long before the attacks
of September 11.22
Not surprisingly, Dershowitz's "torture warrant" has re-
ceived much attention and has been the subject of heated de-
bate. While the idea of torture warrants has attracted sharp• • • 23
criticism, it has also garnered some support from leading legal
scholars .24
This Article challenges both of Dershowitz's propositions
by introducing two interlinked claims based on concepts of
pragmatic absolutism and official disobedience. I argue that
supporting an absolute ban on torture, rather than a qualified
278 (2003) ("There are some articles I never thought I would have to write;
this is one."); Henry Shue, Torture, 7 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 124, 124 (1978) (de-
scribing, but rejecting, the arguments that issues of whether torture may be
permissible ought not to be publicly discussed).
18. ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, WHY TERRORISM WORKS (2002).
19. Id. at 142-49.
20. Id. at 148-49.
21. Id. at 141, 158-63.
22. See id. at 139-41; Alan M. Dershowitz, Is It Necessary to Apply "Physi-
cal Pressure" to Terrorists - and to Lie About It?, 23 ISR. L. REV. 192, 198
(1989); Leon Sheleff, The Necessity of Defense of the Truth: On the Tortuous
Deliberations About the Use of Torture, 17 BAR-ILAN L. STUD. 459, 469-71,
476-79 (2002) [hereinafter Sheleff, Necessity of Defense]; Leon Sheleff, On the
Lesser Evil-On the Landau Committee Report, 1 PLILIM 185 (1990).
23. See, e.g., Kreimer, supra note 17.
24. Sanford Levinson, The Debate on Torture, DISSENT 79, 86-88 (Sum-
mer 2003); Levinson, supra note 10, at 2043-50.
25. For a discussion of these concepts, see Oren Gross, The Prohibition on
Torture and the Limits of the Law, in TORTURE, supra note 12 (manuscript on
file with author).
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prohibition, is the appropriate legal position when examined
from both moral and pragmatic standpoints. However, in truly
catastrophic cases the appropriate method of tackling ex-
tremely grave national dangers and threats may call for going
outside the legal order, at times even violating the otherwise
entrenched absolute prohibition on torture.26 Thus, I defend an
absolute prohibition on torture while, at the same time, argu-
ing that certain extreme circumstances must not be brushed
aside as hypothetical, or as morally or legally irrelevant. The
way to deal with the "extreme" or "catastrophic" case is neither
by ignoring it nor by using it as the centerpiece for establishing
general policies. Rather, my proposal focuses on the possibility
that truly exceptional cases may give rise to official disobedi-
ence: public officials may act extralegally and be ready to ac-
cept the legal ramifications of their actions. Whereas Dershow-
itz argues that torture may be both morally and legally
permissible under certain circumstances, I seek to de-link the
two spheres by suggesting that even if we recognize that tor-
ture may be morally defensible in exceptional cases, that fact
should not affect an uncompromising legal ban on torture.27
The remainder of this Article focuses on preventive interro-
gational torture. Henry Shue identified interrogational torture
as torture aimed at gaining information.28 The adjective "pre-
ventive" limits the concept to torture whose aim is to gain in-
formation that would assist authorities in foiling exceptionally
grave terrorist attacks. Hence, the aim is exclusively forward-
looking. Preventive interrogational torture does not seek to ob-
26. This Article will not attempt to answer the important question of what
precisely constitutes a "truly catastrophic case." I leave this task for another
time. For the purposes of the argument developed in this Article it is sufficient
to acknowledge that some catastrophic case is possible. The Article seeks to set
out an argument for the plausibility of a solution to the difficulties presented
by catastrophic cases, rather than attempt to define more clearly the precise
contours of such a solution. For the sake of discussion, however, we may think
about the paradigmatic case of the "ticking bomb" as a catastrophic case. See
infra note 72 and the accompanying text.
27. See, e.g., Sanford H. Kadish, Torture, the State and the Individual, 23
ISR. L. REV. 345, 354 (1989) ("The distinction is not between what is moral and
what is lawful, but between what is moral for a state to do and what is moral
for an individual to do."); Tibor R. Machan, Exploring Extreme Violence (Tor-
ture), 21 J. SOC. PHIL. 92, 95-96 (1990) ("Sometimes acts may be morally justi-
fied even if the law ought, as a matter of its generality, forbid them .... Al-
though it is credible that even a police officer ought to employ extreme
violence in certain circumstances, it does not follow from this that the law...
ought to sanction such violence.").
28. Shue, supra note 17, at 133.
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tain confessions or other evidence that may be used to bring the
subject of interrogation to criminal trial. Nor is it concerned
with punishing individuals for past actions.29
I should also clarify what "torture" means. Much of the le-
gal discussion in this area revolves around the definition of
"torture." For example, the jurisprudence developed under the
European Convention on Human Rights has tended to tackle
the issue through the prism of a "severity of suffering" test. °
According to this test, a distinction can be drawn among vari-
ous categories of ill-treatment (e.g., ill-treatment that amounts
to "degrading" or "inhuman" treatment or to "torture") as well
as between ill-treatment and treatment that does not cross the
threshold of suffering which would render such treatment im-
permissible.3 Governments have invoked the "severity of suf-
fering" test to argue that interrogation techniques utilized by
their agents, while rough and coercive, did not cause so much
suffering as to brand the interrogators' conduct "ill-
treatment."3 2 Thus, the threshold test of suffering has been
used in an attempt to fly below the radar of the absolute prohi-
bition on torture. I find such definitional wizardry to be unin-
teresting and unsatisfactory. Rather, the argument developed
below seeks to address head-on instances where interrogation
methods are used that clearly fall within the ambit of "torture."
Preventive interrogational torture is far too complex to be ad-
dressed by definitional juggling.
29. See, e.g., John T. Parry & Welsh S. White, Interrogating Suspected
Terrorists: Should Torture Be an Option?, 63 U. PITT. L. REV. 743, 753 (2002)
('U.S. law on torture has developed in situations in which the individual in-
terests at stake are to be weighed against law enforcement's general interest
in solving or punishing a crime; it has not been tested against the more ex-
treme circumstances presented by terrorism.").
30. Fionnuala Ni Aoldin, The European Convention on Human Rights and
Its Prohibition on Torture, in TORTURE, supra note 12 (manuscript on file with
author); EVANS & MORGAN, supra note 11, at 69-98.
31. See, e.g., EVANS & MORGAN, supra note 11, at 73-79; Yutaka Arai-
Yokoi, Grading Scale of Degradation: Identifying the Threshold of Degrading
Treatment or Punishment Under Article 3 ECHR, 21 NETH. Q. HUM. RTS. 385
(2003); Anthony Cullen, Defining Torture in International Law: A Critique of
the Concept Employed by the European Court of Human Rights, 34 CAL. W.
INT'L L.J. 29 (2003).
32. See, e.g., Levinson, supra note 10, at 2036-41; cf. Adrian A.S. Zucker-
man, Coercion and the Judicial Ascertainment of Truth, 23 ISR. L. REV. 357,
371 (1989) (arguing that the Landau Commission's sanctioned "moderate
measure of physical pressure" can only be effective when, from the perspective
of the person undergoing interrogation, the pressure is unbearable).
[Vol 88:14811488
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The debate about the moral and legal nature of the prohi-
bition on torture has followed the fault lines separating deon-
tologists and consequentialists. Part I introduces the two op-
posing perspectives and suggests that the picture is more
complex than either camp would have us believe. It argues that
the case for an absolute prohibition on torture can be made
stronger and more compelling by wedding together nonconse-
quential and pragmatic claims. Part II argues that catastrophic
cases present open-minded absolutists with a critical dilem-
matic choice. It charts some of the traditional methods that
supporters of an absolute ban on torture have employed to re-
solve that dilemma. Part III presents the official disobedience
model for addressing the tragic choice between security and
liberty that the catastrophic case presents. This model supports
a legal absolute ban on torture while, at the same time, recog-
nizing that in catastrophic cases resort to preventive interroga-
tional torture may be morally permissible. According to this
model, catastrophic cases may entail public officials going out-
side the legal order, at times violating otherwise accepted con-
stitutional principles. It is then up to society as a whole to de-
cide how to respond ex post to extralegal actions undertaken by
these officials. Ex post ratification is, therefore, a critical ele-
ment of the proposed model. Part IV outlines the benefits of
such ex post ratification. Part V examines Alan Dershowitz's
"torture warrants" proposal. It argues that a method of ex post
ratification, as suggested by the official disobedience model, is
preferable to ex ante judicial approval of interrogational tor-
ture.
A final word before going further: The issue of preventive
interrogational torture is morally and legally complex. Tackling
it is emotionally demanding. Graphic images of people bearing
gruesome physical and mental scars inflicted on them by their
torturers and images of the mutilated bodies of those who were
murdered or critically injured in terrorist attacks, are often
used as currency in the debate. Thus, "[iut is with trembling
hand [that] I enter upon [the] difficult and invidious task"33 of
dealing with these issues and with the tragic choices with
which they present us.
33. W.L. Twining & P.E. Twining, Bentham on Torture, 24 N. IR. LEGAL
Q. 305, 320 (1973) (quoting Jeremy Bentham's manuscript "Of Torture").
1489
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
I. THE CASE FOR AN ABSOLUTE PROHIBITION
ON TORTURE
The debate over the moral and legal nature of the prohibi-
tion on torture is, for the most part, waged along the fault lines
between deontologists and consequentialists. It is but one ex-
ample (stark, to be sure) of the deep ideological schism in moral
philosophy between those who believe that certain actions may
be inherently morally wrong, regardless of the consequences of
such actions, and those who believe that the worth of such ac-
tions is dependent on, and dictated by, their consequences.
Thus, one may support an absolute ban on torture even in
times of great calamity. Alternatively, one may believe that the
duty not to torture, even if generally laudable, is overridden,
canceled, or trumped by competing values in certain excep-
tional circumstances. To put it somewhat differently, the issue
at hand goes to the heart of the debate about means and ends,
i.e., are there "limits on what may be done even in the service
of an end worth pursuing-and even when adherence to the re-
striction may be very costly"?34 In this debate, each camp seems
to have a winning argument up its sleeve. Deontologists chal-
lenge the supporters of consequentialist moral theories as inca-
pable of setting any meaningful restrictions and limitations on
the performance of horrible acts: So long as the total outcomes
of such acts are deemed socially beneficial, they ought to be
carried out. Regardless of how abominable we regard certain
actions to be, it is only their consequences that matter. Conse-
quentialists counter the challenge by arguing that deontologists
are unable to address situations where adhering by preset re-
strictions on certain actions would bar our ability to prevent
the occurrence of a true catastrophe.
The problem is that both sets of challenges, in their pure
forms, seem compelling yet, at the same time, mutually exclu-
sive. Whichever side a person assumes, either as a general
matter or when attending to a concrete state of affairs, she is
bound to be charged with subjectivism. The closer we get to ac-
cepting one position, the greater the challenge we face from the
opposite perspective. Thus, we are faced with a truly tragic
34. Thomas Nagel, War and Massacre, in WAR AND MORAL
RESPONSIBILITY 3, 4 (Marshall Cohen et al. eds., 1974); see also Richard A.
Posner, Torture, Terrorism, and Interrogation, in TORTURE, supra note 12
(manuscript at 3-4, on file with author).
1490 [Vol 88:1481
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moral dilemma without any hope of finding a solution that
would satisfy both camps simultaneously. We are condemned to
act in a way that is deemed bad when judged from at least one
of the competing perspectives (and, possibly, both). 5 As Alan
Dershowitz correctly notes, we are ill-equipped to "choose
among unreasonable alternatives, each so horrible that our
mind rebels even at the notion of thinking about the evil op-
tions."3
In fact, we may say that no real debate actually takes place
between the two opposing positions since the arguments and
counterarguments of the various parties are made on separate
levels, each assuming a different set of relevant criteria by
which to evaluate the validity and legitimacy of potential
claims. Insistence on pursuing deontological arguments, to the
exclusion of any reference to potential consequences, is unlikely
to help a deontologist convince a consequentialist to see the
merits in the former's point of view, and vice versa.
This Article argues that the overall picture is richer and
more complex than either side lets on, and that it calls for a
more sophisticated treatment. This part begins with a brief re-
view of the traditional opposing poles on the question of pre-
ventive interrogational torture and the critiques leveled
against each position. I argue that the case for an absolute pro-
hibition on torture is compelling. However, the case for an abso-
lute ban cannot be made solely within the four walls of non-
consequentialist arguments. While such arguments support a
strong ban on torture, they do not, in and of themselves, pre-
sent a compelling case for an absolute ban. More is needed to
justify an absolute prohibition on torture. I anchor that neces-
sary addition in pragmatic or instrumental reasons that, in
turn, promote and facilitate the noninstrumental goals and
values that are usually associated with an absolute ban on tor-
ture .37
35. Nagel, supra note 34, at 24 ("[It is naive to suppose that there is a so-
lution to every moral problem with which the world can face us. We have al-
ways known that the world is a bad place. It appears that it may be an evil
place as well.").
36. DERSHOWITZ, supra note 18, at 133.
37. See Frederick Schauer, Commensurability and Its Constitutional Con-
sequences, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 785, 786 (1994) (arguing that there is nothing
morally suspect in choosing strategically to internalize a view of commensura-
bility or incommensurability "based on an admittedly instrumental calculation
of which position would better serve deeper noninstrumental values"). But see
MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF
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A. IN SUPPORT OF AN ABSOLUTE PROHIBITION:
MORAL ABSOLUTISM AND RULE CONSEQUENTIALISM
Absolutists-those who believe that an unconditional ban
on torture ought to apply without exception regardless of cir-
cumstances--often base their position on deontological
grounds. For adherents of the absolutist view of morality, tor-
ture is intrinsically wrong. 8 It violates the physical and mental
integrity of the person subjected to it, negates her autonomy,
and deprives her of human dignity. 9 It reduces her to a mere
object, a body from which information is to be extracted; it co-
erces her to act in a manner that may be contrary to her most
fundamental beliefs, values, and interests, depriving her of any
choice and controlling her voice. 0 Torture is also wrong because
of its depraving and corrupting effects on individual torturers
and society at large.41 Moreover, torture is an evil that can
never be justified or excused. Under no circumstances should
the resort to torture be morally acceptable or legally permissi-
ble. It is a reprehensible action whose wrongfulness may never
be assuaged or rectified morally even if the consequences of
taking such action in any particular case are deemed to be, on
the whole, good.42 Indeed, one may argue that the inherent
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT 47 (1989) (arguing that attempts to recon-
cile similar contradictions are bound to result in an "impoverished and unre-
flective pragmatism").
38. Michael S. Moore, Torture and the Balance of Evils, 23 ISR. L. REV.
280, 297-98 (1989).
39. A classic discussion is ELAINE SCARRY, THE BODY IN PAIN: THE
MAKING AND UNMAKING OF THE WORLD 27-59 (1985). See also Kreimer, supra
note 17, at 295-99; Mordechai Kremnitzer, The Landau Commission Report-
Was the Security Service Subordinated to the Law, or the Law to the "Needs" of
the Security Service?, 23 ISR. L. REV. 216, 248-51 (1989).
40. See, e.g., SCARRY, supra note 39, at 35-36.
41. See, e.g., FRIEDRICH W. NIETZSCHE, THUS SPAKE ZARATHUSTRA 79 (A.
Tillet & M.M. Bozman trans., J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd. 1933) (1896) ("And if a
friend wrong do thee, say: 'I forgive thee what thou didst unto me; but that
thou didst it unto thyself-how could I forgive thee that?'"); Kremnitzer, supra
note 39, at 260-61; Henry Shue, The Debate on Torture, DISSENT 79, at 90, 91
(Summer 2003) ("ITIhe ultimate reason not to inflict agony upon other human
beings is that it is degrading to all involved: all become less human." (respond-
ing to Levinson, supra note 24)); see also Introduction, in THEORIES OF RIGHTS
1, 12-13 (Jeremy Waldron ed., 1984) (suggesting that the interest theory of
rights permits consideration not only of the interests of the rights holder (as a
right-based theory would), but also the interests of the duty bearer (a perspec-
tive usually associated with duty-based theories)); cf. Posner, supra note 34
(manuscript at 6) ("Torture is uncivilized, but civilized nations are able to em-
ploy uncivilized means ... without becoming uncivilized in the process.").
42. It is often argued that refraining from torture, like many other human
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wrongfulness of torture and possible good consequences are
incommensurable, i.e., they cannot be measured by any com-
mon currency and therefore cannot be compared, or balanced,
one against the other.43 The conclusion drawn from such a
claim is that "the wrong of torture can be taken as a trump or
side constraint on welfare maximization in all possible cases."
Under those terms, the ban on torture constitutes an uncondi-
tional duty to refrain from torturing others.45
For the ban on torture to constitute such an unconditional
duty (assuming, arguendo, that such absolute duties actually
exist), the duty must override, at all times and under all cir-
cumstances, all competing values and rights.46 One must ad-
here to the prohibition on torture even in exceptional circum-
stances where the use of torture would save the lives of a large
number of innocent individuals, even if our loved ones are
decisions and actions, cannot be understood in terms of cost-benefit analysis or
balancing of competing values and interests. See, for example, T. Alexander
Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943, 997-
98 (1987):
In life and law.., we often make decisions in ways that cannot be
characterized as balancing. Many decisions based on notions of right
and wrong, fairness, desert, love, and passion seem to have nothing to
do with balancing .... Behind many of the most important decisions
we make, the most important beliefs we hold, are judgments of prin-
ciple that do not reduce to balancing. These judgments may be leaps
of faith; they may be premises, not proofs. But they form the bedrock
of our moral systems.
43. Against those who espouse the position that all values are commensu-
rable are those who argue that there are values that cannot be measured
against each other. Under the latter view, for example, if we accept the argu-
ment that the prohibition on torture is intrinsically incommensurable with
any other value, then its value cannot be compared against such values nor
can it be "balanced" by them in any given case. See Schauer, supra note 37, at
786. Yet, others may argue that even if we accept that the relevant values and
interests could be somehow compared, or balanced, one against the other, we
should still make the choice not to do so. See KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 37, at
40-48.
44. Schauer, supra note 37, at 790.
45. According to some theories of rights, the right not to be tortured may
have more than one correlative duty. Thus, for example, Waldron argues that
the right not to be tortured may entail, in addition to the negative duty not to
torture, also positive duties such as a duty to educate people about the wrong-
fulness of torture, a duty to investigate complaints of torture, and a duty to
pay one's share for the political and administrative setups that might be nec-
essary to prevent torture. JEREMY WALDRON, LIBERAL RIGHTS: COLLECTED
PAPERS 1981-1991, at 25, 212-13 (1993) (applying his notion of "waves of du-
ties" in the context of the right not to be tortured).
46. Alan Gewirth, Are There Any Absolute Rights?, 31 PHIL. Q. 1, 5-6
(1981).
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among the lives that could be saved. In fact, even if torture
would save the life of the individual under interrogation, we
must still refrain from applying torture.47 As an agent-relative
moral theory, the absolutist position informs and directs every
one of us not to engage in any way in the act of torture, what-
ever the circumstances. Thus, I may not torture any individual,
even when violating the prohibition may spare others from be-
ing tortured.48
Thus, moral absolutists must maintain their support for
the unconditional ban on torture even, in fact precisely, when
the harmful outcomes of abstaining from use of torture in any
given case are of catastrophic proportions. The likelihood that
such catastrophic cases will occur, while bearing considerable
weight when assessing the pragmatic reasons for an absolute
ban on torture, is of little significance when discussing the
moral basis for such a ban. True moral absolutists must sup-
port a ban on torture no matter how likely the harm and no
matter how great the magnitude of that harm.49 If one is to
47. Consider, for example, a ticking bomb scenario when the suspected
terrorist is captured by state agents in the mall where he planted the bomb
and as the bomb may go off shortly, he is interrogated on the spot. Should he
refuse to divulge information about the location of the bomb and the bomb
goes off he, as well as thousands of innocent civilians in the mall, will be killed
in the blast.
48. A moral theory is agent neutral when it gives every agent the same
aim (e.g., overall welfare maximization). A theory is agent relative when it as-
signs different aims to different agents (e.g., I will not break my promises; you
will not break your promises; and so on). An absolute prohibition on torture is
deemed to be agent relative. It informs each of us, as moral agents, that we
must not torture ourselves. This agent relativism means that we are barred
from resorting to torture even when such actions would prevent others from
torturing, murdering, or committing any number of heinous crimes. An agent-
neutral ban on torture can only assign us all the identical task of minimizing
the aggregate number of acts of torture. Thus, according to this logic each of
us may be morally permitted to use torture when this would result in a lower
number of acts of torture overall. See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND
UTOPIA 28-33 (1974); Nagel, supra note 34, at 12 ("Absolutism requires that
we avoid murder at all costs, not that we prevent it at all costs."); see also Rosa
Ehrenreich Brooks, The New Imperialism: Violence, Norms, and the 'Rule of
Law", 101 MICH. L. REV. 2275, 2316-18 (2003) (arguing that the absolute pro-
hibition on torture is not concerned about reducing violence and suffering, but
rather it is concerned with "mak[ing] a statement about the moral meaning of
human action. It is not in fact terribly interested in anyone's death or suffer-
ing. Mostly, it is concerned with how we live our lives.").
49. Gewirth rejects the claim that the absolutist is indifferent to conse-
quences. In his view, the absolutist is concerned about the consequences that
may emerge "so long as he does not regard them as possibly superseding or
diminishing the right and duty he regards as absolute." Gewirth, supra note
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maintain a position that recognizes the existence of absolute
rights and duties, in general, and the duty to refrain from tor-
ture, in particular, one must define the relevant right or duty
without reference to catastrophic cases. One must accept a
definition of the relevant right or duty that is truly uncondi-
tional.50
However, even those who generally believe that no aggre-
gate social benefits may ever justify or excuse preventive inter-
rogational torture are hard pressed to maintain that position in
cases where there is a real likelihood that a harm of catastro-
phic proportions will materialize if torture is not used. Many
who support absolute, categorical rights (and, where relevant,
prohibitions) realize that their position is untenable, not only
practically but also morally speaking, when applied to such
catastrophic cases.51
Another possible source of support for an absolute ban on
torture comes from some advocates of rule-consequentialist
moral theories."2 Rule consequentialists would typically argue
that consequential reasoning (e.g., long-term utility if one is
rule utilitarian) justifies the adoption of an absolute prohibition
on torture. And once such a rule is adopted, when we come to
make decisions about particular cases, we ought to adhere
strictly to the rule and ignore calls to recalculate costs and
benefits that are case specific. Contextual considerations of ex-
pediency cannot serve as a valid reason to deviate from the
general rule. An uncompromising rule consequentialist would
argue that once the rule is formulated, particular circum-
stances become irrelevant. All that matters is the rule.5' No sec-
ond guessing is permissible.
46, at 10. The absolutist can seek ways to mitigate the threatened disastrous
consequences, but if all else fails he must maintain his commitment to the ab-
solute prohibition. Id.
50. Id. at 5.
51. See infra Part II.
52. Rule consequentialism focuses on the consequences of general rules or
principles for action. Its adherents judge the rightfulness or wrongfulness of
an action by the goodness or badness of the consequences of a rule that states
that everyone ought to perform such action in like circumstances. See the
definition of "Consequentialism" in BRIAN Bix, A DICTIONARY OF LEGAL
THEORY (forthcoming 2004). See also J.J.C. SMART & BERNARD WILLIAMS,
UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND AGAINST 9-11, 118-34 (1973).
53. See, e.g., FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A
PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND




Rule consequentialists may start off, for example, by argu-
ing that the social costs of permitting the use of torture, even in
narrowly defined exceptional circumstances (assuming that
such exceptional circumstances lend themselves, at all, to nar-
rowly tailored definitions), would always outweigh the social
benefits that could be derived from applying torture. Torture
would always be a good-diminishing, rather than good-
enhancing, activity. Hence, there is no point in balancing on a
case-by-case basis with respect to the question of torture. A cor-
rectly calibrated cost-benefit analysis must always, ab definitio,
lead to the same conclusion, i.e., that torture should not be al-
lowed regardless of any specific context. A case-specific analysis
can only lead to a conclusion contrary to the general rule when
based on a distorted calculation. Such distortion would result
from biased focus on isolated cases that ignores long-term and
systemic implications of particular courses of action. If a cost-
benefit analysis was correctly applied in each particular case,
the results would only uphold the basic prohibition. Moreover,
even if one could conceive of concrete incidences when particu-
larist reasoning permitted, after accounting appropriately for
all the relevant factors, torture in that specific case-namely,
that resorting to torture in the specific case at hand may be, on
the whole, socially beneficial-rule consequentialists would still
argue that this should not matter. The general rule against tor-
ture must be followed and applied, and particular consequen-
tialist analysis resisted, even if doing so may lead to less bene-
ficial consequences in the particular instance than a contextual
decision-making process would yield.54 Applying the rule to all
circumstances is beneficial inasmuch as it minimizes the possi-
bility of errors in the decision-making process."
But it is precisely this last point that presents the most
critical challenge to rule consequentialism by exposing it to the
charge of "rule worship"; it leads to "preferring abstract con-
formity to a rule to the prevention of avoidable human suffer-
ing."" The charge is that in those concrete cases where it seems
54. For a recent defense of "acontextual decisionmaking," see FREDERICK
SCHAUER, PROFILES, PROBABILITIES AND STEREOTYPES 21-24 (2003).
55. Note that Schauer suggests that acontextual decision making may
even be defensible when it leads to more, rather than fewer, errors as com-
pared with a particular, context-based decision-making process. SCHAUER, su-
pra note 54, at 24.
56. SMART & WILLIAMS, supra note 52, at 6. John Smart explains the
charge of "rule worship" in the following way: "the rule-utilitarian presumably
advocates his principle because he is ultimately concerned with human happi-
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that deviating from the rule may bring about better results
than following the rule, one can either follow a rule-based deci-
sion-making process or adhere to consequentialist reasoning,
but not do both. In other words, in such circumstances rule
consequentialism encompasses irreconcilable internal inconsis-
tencies. To strictly follow the rule becomes irrational from a
consequentialist point of view and inconsistent with one's gen-
eral position. Yet to ignore the rule and adopt a particularist
view makes the rule meaningless. 7 However, if we want rules,
as such, to serve as meaningful limitations on the discretion of
decision makers and guide their behavior, the rules cannot be
subject to particularistic challenges that seek to rebalance the
basic values and interests that underlie the rule. Thus we come
full circle back to the fundamental dilemma of what is to be
done about the particular, concrete case where following the
absolutist rule strikes us as unjust or inefficient (depending on
our relevant set of values). As I will suggest below, thinking
about catastrophic cases may hold one possible solution to the
problem.
B. CHALLENGES TO AN UNCONDITIONAL BAN:
ACT CONSEQUENTIALISM
Those who, like Dershowitz, claim that use of coercive in-
terrogation methods may be justified in certain-albeit excep-
tional and extraordinary-circumstances reject arguments in
support of an absolute ban on torture. Under this position,
which can be termed the "conditional ban" approach, there
seems to be no place for a comprehensive and absolute a priori
prohibition on the use of torture.
Invariably, most arguments in support of a conditional ban
are act consequentialist claims, mostly of the utilitarian flavor,
comparing costs and benefits on a case-by-case basis.58 A par-
ness: why then should he advocate abiding by a rule when he knows that it
will not in the present case be most beneficial to abide by it?" Id. at 10.
57. SCHAUER, supra note 53, at 77-78.
58. See, e.g., Gary E. Jones, On the Permissibility of Torture, 6 J. MED.
ETHICS 11, 11 (1980); Posner, supra note 34 (manuscript at 4); Twining &
Twining, supra note 33, at 347-48. Posner provides a particularly good exam-
ple of this argument:
[Wihat is required is a balance between the costs and the benefits of
particular methods of interrogation .... Certainly the costs include
the horror that the term "torture" evokes, but the costs can be out-
weighed by the benefits if torture is the only means by which to save
the lives of thousands, perhaps tens or hundreds of thousands, of peo-
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ticularistic calculus may lead to the conclusion that, at least in
some cases, the benefits of using torture exceed its social costs.
Using torture would, therefore, maximize good consequences or
minimize bad ones.59 Conditionalists argue that the prohibition
on torture cannot be defensible as a moral absolute. While an
important and fundamental principle, the right to be free from
torture (and the concomitant prohibition on torture) is not the
only value in play in extreme circumstances. For example, a
standard consequentialist argument is that torturing one per-
son may be justified when it is necessary to save the lives of
many innocent persons who would otherwise meet a certain
death.60 When the choice is between the physical integrity and
dignity of a suspected terrorist and the lives of a great many
innocent persons, an absolute ban on torture cannot be morally
defensible.6' The following argument by Dershowitz is repre-
sentative of this position:
The simple cost-benefit analysis for employing such nonlethal tor-
ture seems overwhelming: it is surely better to inflict nonlethal pain
on one guilty terrorist who is illegally withholding information needed
to prevent an act of terrorism than to permit a large number of inno-
cent victims to die. Pain is a lesser and more remediable harm than
death; and the lives of a thousand innocent people should be valued
more than the bodily integrity of one guilty person.62
The fact that all but unabashed Kantians recognize the difficul-
ties that extreme cases present to any absolutist position is fur-
ther evidence that an absolutist position with respect to the
ban on torture is untenable.63
Aside from the important question of what yardsticks
should be used in measuring the goodness (or badness) of con-
sequences, act consequentialists must contend with several
ple. In so extreme a case... torture must be allowed.
Posner, supra note 34 (manuscript at 4).
59. See, e.g., Twining & Twining, supra note 33, at 306.
60. Bentham constructed a similar case in which using torture against
"one criminal" would lead to the "rescuing from torture... [one] hundred in-
nocents." In arguing that torture ought to be used in this case he concludes by
stating: "To say nothing of wisdom, could any pretence be made so much as to
the praise of blind and vulgar humanity, by the man who to save one criminal,
should determine to abandon a 100 innocent persons to the same fate?" Twin-
ing & Twining, supra note 33, at 347 n.3 (quoting Jeremy Bentham, Manu-
scripts Box 74.b, 429 (May 27, 1804)).
61. See, e.g., Winfried Brugger, May Government Ever Use Torture? Two
Responses from German Law, 48 AM. J. COMP. L. 661, 676 (2000); Sheleff, Ne-
cessity of Defense, supra note 22, at 485-88.
62. DERSHOWITZ, supra note 18, at 144 (footnote omitted).
63. See infra Part II.
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critical challenges, which, taken together, suggest that act con-
sequentialism leads to too much, rather than too little, use of
torture. First, act consequentialists are faulted with treating
torture as morally neutral, since all that really matters are re-
sults. The value of using torture is dependent on, and deter-
mined by, the outcomes. In this respect, consequentialism pre-
sents us with an empty justificatory vessel into which we can1 4
pour repugnant courses of action. Act consequentialism has no
built-in limitations. No act is undesirable per se.65 The conse-
quences of the act in each and every concrete case determine
moral worth and value. For example, most of those who would
support the possible use of torture on consequentialist grounds
are quite clear that they would only support torture when it is
directed against a person who is not innocent. 6  Dershowitz rec-
ognizes the need to impose some limitations on "single-case
utilitarian justification" for torture, otherwise "we risk hurtling
down a slippery slope into the abyss of amorality and ulti-
mately tyranny."" Yet the problem is that no such inherent
limitations are available under a pure act consequentialist ren-
dition. If, for instance, in order to save the lives of a thousand
64. See, e.g., Nagel, supra note 34, at 6 (arguing that absolutist intuitions
"are often the only barrier before the abyss of utilitarian apologetics for large-
scale murder"). One counterargument is that welfare maximization will not
lead to the implementation of objectionable preferences because the negative
effects of such preferences are bound to outweigh their benefits to the people
holding them. See LOuIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAiRNESS VERSUS WEL-
FARE 427 (2002). Another argument is that not all preferences ought to be
accorded the same value. Some are weightier than others. We may say that
the ban on torture carries more weight than competing interests and values
and therefore it is only permissible to resort to torture under a cost-benefit
calculus when the harm to be prevented exceeds, in overall quality, the dam-
age caused by using torture.
65. Indeed, as Dershowitz recognizes, "[elven terrorism itself could be jus-
tified by a case utilitarian approach." DERSHOWITZ, supra note 18, at 146; see
also Kadish, supra note 27, at 353.
66. See, for example, Machan, supra note 27, at 94:
[Extreme] violence may indeed be morally justified at times but only
if some measure of moral guilt is present or highly probable on the
part of the party about to experience the violence .... [A]ccordingly, I
should not torture someone whom I know to be entirely innocent of
the relevant evils even if his or her torture would secure some great
good.
It is important to note that "innocence" here is not equated with either moral
or legal innocence. The relevant criterion is not whether a person is morally
good or bad, nor is it whether a person has been convicted in a court of law. As
Nagel correctly puts it "'innocent' means 'currently harmless,' and it is opposed
not to 'guilty' but to 'doing harm.'" Nagel, supra note 34, at 19.
67. DERSHOWITZ, supra note 18, at 146.
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innocent civilians, we must torture an innocent child (e.g., the
suspect's child), cost-benefit arguments appear to still support• 68
using torture. Dershowitz attempts to escape this difficulty by
suggesting that any act-consequentialist account must be sub-
ject to certain external limitations. He identifies potential
sources for such limitations and constraints in "rule utilitarian-
isms or other principles of morality, such as the prohibition
against deliberately punishing the innocent."69 Still, the ques-
tion remains as to the source and identification of such external
limitations and how much of a constraint they are likely to be
in truly catastrophic cases.
A second charge leveled against act consequentialists is
that of bias towards immediate consequences that discounts (or
ignores entirely) long-term consequences of the use of torture.
In the example noted above, decision makers will be biased to-
wards the fate of the thousand innocent persons who are going
to die if torture is not applied, while not giving adequate weight
to long-term detrimental effects of using torture in the particu-
lar case. We tend to undervalue future benefits and costs when
comparing them with present benefits and costs.7" Thus, longer-
term costs for the rule of law and individual rights and liberties
tend to be overly discounted. The intangible and abstract na-
ture of such future costs, in comparison with the very tangible
pending catastrophe, exacerbates this defect in our risk as-
sessment.71
C. PRAGMATIC ABSOLUTISM
Whether one accepts that there are no circumstances un-
68. Samuel Scheffler, Introduction, in CONSEQUENTIALISM AND ITS
CRITICS 3 (Samuel Scheffler ed., 1988).
69. DERSHOWITZ, supra note 18, at 146; see also Peter Railton, Alienation,
Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality, in CONSEQUENTIALISM AND
ITS CRITICS, supra note 68, at 93, 108-21 (suggesting that moral aversion
places limitations on consequentialist reasoning and may lead to well-
motivated individuals being unable to bring themselves to do the right thing-
such as torture or otherwise harm others-in particular circumstances); T.M.
Scanlon, Rights, Goals, and Fairness, in CONSEQUENTIALISM AND ITS CRITICS,
supra note 68, at 74, 75-76 (suggesting that individual rights ought to be
given a special place as imposing constraints on consequentialist reasoning).
70. See, eg., Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Lim-
its of Contract, 47 STAN. L. REV. 211, 222 (1995); E.L. Quarantelli & Russell R.
Dynes, Community Conflict: Its Absence and Its Presence in Natural Disasters,
1 MASS EMERGENCIES 139, 142 (1976) (discussing how disasters lead to focus-
ing on the present).
71. See, e.g., David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REV. 953, 955 (2002).
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der which use of torture is morally permissible, or believes that
there are situations in which resort to torture may be morally
defensible, supporting an absolute legal ban on torture makes
sense. The absolute proscription of torture poses no difficulty
for the former and requires no further explanation. Yet, even
one who recognizes the moral complexities of an absolute ban
on torture may, nonetheless, support an absolute legal ban on
torture.
As suggested above, insistence on pursuing deontological
arguments, to the exclusion of any reference to potential conse-
quences, is unlikely to help a deontologist convince a conse-
quentialist to see the merits in the former's point of view, and
vice versa. While such arguments support a strong ban on tor-
ture, they do not, in and of themselves, present a compelling
case for an absolute ban (at least they do not present a case
that would be deemed compelling when viewed from a conse-
quentialist perspective). Pragmatic, instrumental reasons pro-
vide additional support for an absolute prohibition on torture
and further promote and facilitate the noninstrumental goals
and values that are usually associated with such an absolute
ban.
The remainder of this part outlines some of the more sali-
ent instrumental arguments in support of an absolute ban on
torture:
1. Setting general policy, accommodating exceptional cases.
While catastrophic cases are not just hypothetical scenarios
conjured up in academic ivory towers, they are extremely rare
in practice. Consider the paradigmatic catastrophic case-the
ticking bomb scenario. The police have in custody a person who
they are absolutely certain has planted a massive bomb some-
where in a bustling shopping mall. The bomb may go off at any
moment, and there is not enough time to evacuate the building.
Thousands of casualties are expected should the bomb go off.
The only lead that the police have to locate the bomb is the per-
son in custody, but she refuses to reveal the location of the
bomb. Police investigators are certain, beyond any doubt, that
the only way of getting the information from her is by torturing
her. They are also confident that if torture is applied, the sus-
pect will divulge correct information about the location of the
bomb, thus giving the bomb squad a better chance of disarming
it in time.
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Each of the elements of this paradigmatic case may be
heavily contested and challenged. 2 How would the police be
certain that the person actually planted the bomb or otherwise
knows of its location? Indeed, how certain can they be that a
bomb was, in fact, planted and activated? Is torture the only
means to extract the critical information from the suspect, or
perhaps is more investigative creativity needed on the part of
the police to come up with innovative ways to obtain coopera-
tion from the suspect? 3 How can the police be confident that in-
formation disclosed under torture will be correct?74 Is there
72. See, e.g., Shue, supra note 41, at 91; Eyal Press, In Torture We Trust?,
THE NATION, Mar. 13, 2003 (quoting Professor David Cole: "You can't know
whether a person knows where the bomb is, or even if they're telling the truth.
Because of this, you end up going down a slippery slope and sanctioning tor-
ture in general."), available at http://www.thenation.com/doc.mhtml?i=
2003033 1&s=press&c= 1.
73. See, e.g., John H. Langbein, The Legal History of Torture, in TORTURE,
supra note 12 (manuscript at 13, on file with author) (quoting an observation
made to Sir James Fitzjames Stephen: "It is far pleasanter to sit comfortably
in the share rubbing red pepper into some poor devil's eyes than to go about in
the sun hunting up evidence."); Kremnitzer, supra note 39, at 254 (arguing
that interrogational torture "may become a refuge for the lazy, impatient, un-
skillful interrogator" since "[t]he existence of the licence to employ physical
pressure... is... liable to constitute a negative incentive regarding the de-
velopment and perfection of non-violent means of interrogation").
74. It is often argued, especially in the context of evaluating the reliability
of statements and confessions made under pressure and coercion, that torture
does not work in so far as it leads to false statements by the persons undergo-
ing interrogations, since they will say and admit to anything in order to stop
the violence perpetrated against them. See, e.g., Levinson, supra note 10, at
2028-31; Michael Ratner, Moving Away from the Rule of Law: Military Tribu-
nals, Executive Detentions and Torture, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1513, 1521
(2003); cf William J. Stuntz, Christian Legal Theory, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1707,
1743 (2003) (reviewing CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL THOUGHT (Mi-
chael W. McConnell et al. eds., 2001)) (recognizing the law's potential to cause
worse problems by downplaying the error costs of competing policy alterna-
tives). The risk of false statements and confessions certainly adds weight to
the pragmatic reasons supporting an absolute ban on torture. However, we
must be careful not to take this argument too far, especially in the context of
preventive interrogational torture. There may well be circumstances where
such torture does work. See, e.g., DERSHOWITZ, supra note 18, at 137. A recent
example where the threat of torture produced the critical information sought
by the interrogators was in a kidnapping case in Germany. On September 27,
2002, Magnus Gdfgen kidnapped Jakob von Metzler, the eleven-year-old son of
a prominent German banker. Four days later Gafgen was arrested by the
Frankfurt police after police officers watched him pick up the one million Eu-
ros ransom paid by the boy's family. Hours into his interrogation by the police,
Gdfgen refused to disclose the whereabouts of the kidnapped boy. Fearing for
the boy's life, the deputy police chief of Frankfurt ordered the interrogators to
threaten Gafgen with torture. Within a few minutes after being so threatened,
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really not enough time to evacuate the premises and avoid loss
of innocent life in that way? And so on.
When we set out to chart a general policy on the issue of
torture, we must ask ourselves whether our general policy
ought to be shaped around the contours of these rare excep-
tions. Or is there an independent value in striking a strong po-
sition in favor of an absolute ban on torture? Those who believe,
as I do, that catastrophic cases are hard ones from both ethical
and legal perspectives, must be mindful of the risk of creating
bad law (and ethics) to answer the particular needs of such
hard cases.
However, we must also be careful not to go to the other ex-
treme. There is a difference between ignoring completely truly
catastrophic cases and focusing our attention elsewhere when
designing general rules and policies. While general policies
ought not to be constructed around exceptional cases, one
should not ignore the reality of hard cases, however rare they
may be. Henry Shue warns us that "artificial cases make bad
ethics."76 This is certainly an attractive proposition. Yet its
problem lies in the fact that catastrophic cases are not "artifi-
cial." They are real, albeit rare. Ignoring them completely, by
rhetorically relegating them to the level of "artificial," is
Gafgen gave the police the information about the boy's location. Unfortu-
nately, when the police arrived at the scene, Jakob was found dead. It later
was discovered that Gt.fgen murdered the boy less than two hours after he had
kidnapped him. See Richard Bernstein, Kidnapping Has Germans Debating
Police Torture, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2003, at A3; John Hooper, Kidnap Case
Presents Germans with Ugly Dilemma over Torture, THE GUARDIAN, Feb. 27,
2003, at 18. Gtifgen was eventually convicted and sentenced to life imprison-
ment. Kidnapper Gets Life in Murder of Boy, CHI. TRIB., July 29, 2003, at 3. At
the time of writing an appeal against the conviction, claiming that Gafgen's
confession was obtained under coercion and duress, was still pending. Derek
Scally, Man Who Murdered Heir (11) Gets Life, IRISH TIMES, July 29, 2003, at
9. At the time of writing, criminal charges have been brought against Frank-
furt's deputy chief of police who ordered using threats of torture against the
kidnapper, as well as against the officer who actually threatened Gafgen.
Hugh Williamson, German Police Officer Faces Charges, FINANCIAL TIMES,
Feb. 21, 2004, at 5.
75. See, e.g., PHILIP B. HEYMANN, TERRORISM, FREEDOM, AND SECURITY:
WINNING WITHOUT WAR 111-12 (2003).
76. Shue, supra note 17, at 141; see also Richard H. Weisberg, Loose Pro-
fessionalism, or Why Lawyers Take the Lead on Torture, in TORTURE, supra
note 12 (manuscript at 8-9, on file with author) (arguing that the ticking bomb
hypothetical "lacks the virtues of intelligence, appropriateness and especially
sophistication" and suggesting that "complex rationalizers" who peg their
theories on such examples "wind up being more naive than those who speak
strictly, directly, and simply, against injustice").
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utopian, or naive at best.
77
2. Symbolism, myths, and education. A categorical legal
prohibition on torture is also desirable in order to uphold the
symbolism of human dignity and the inviolability of the human
body. Such a prohibition not only approximates what decent
people believe, but also the society we wish to live in and be-
long to. 78 Indeed, even if one believes that an absolute ban on
torture is unrealistic, as a practical matter, there is independ-
ent value in upholding the myth that an absolute ban exists."79
Such a position provides obvious notice that fundamental
rights and values are not forsaken, whatever the circum-
stances, and that cries of national security, emergency, and ca-
tastrophe do not trump fundamental liberties.80 The more en-
trenched a norm is-and the prohibition on torture is among
the most entrenched norms-the harder it will be for govern-
ment to convince the public that violating that norm is neces-
sary.
An absolute prohibition on torture also plays a significant
educational function. It attaches special-moral, political, so-
cial, and legal-condemnation to torture as abhorrent.81 This
77. See infra Part II.
78. Charles L. Black, Jr., Mr. Justice Black, the Supreme Court, and the
Bill of Rights, HARPER'S MAGAZINE 63, 67 (Feb. 1961), reprinted in CHARLES
BLACK, THE OCCASIONS OF JUSTICE: ESSAYS MOSTLY ON LAW 89-102 (1963);
see also H.C. 5100/94, Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. The State of
Israel, 53(4) P.D. 817, 845 (Barak, P.) A democracy has "the upper hand" even
though it "must sometimes fight with one hand behind its back." Id. This is
because "[tihe rule of law and the liberty of an individual constitute important
components in its understanding of security. At the end of the day, they
strengthen its spirit and this strength allows it to overcome its difficulties." Id.
79. On the value of myths see, for example, Judith Olans Brown et al.,
The Mythogenesis of Gender: Judicial Images of Women in Paid and Unpaid
Labor, 6 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 457, 457-58 (1996) ("Myths can create reality
and increase meaning, operating not as reflection but inspiration."); Frederick
Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 399, 439 (1985) ("Myths serve impor-
tant functions. They provide goals and ideals, and as such they channel our
thinking.").
80. Nagel, supra note 34, at 5 ("There are strong utilitarian reasons for
adhering to any limitation which seems natural to most people-particularly if
the limitation is widely accepted already. An exceptional measure which
seems to be justified by its results in a particular conflict may create a prece-
dent with disastrous long-term effects.").
81. Gross, supra note 9, at 791-93 (noting a similar result achieved by
designating actions as "grave breaches"); Kadish, supra note 27, at 352 ("In
terms of creating an appropriate moral climate and minimizing the occasions
when torture is employed, it is one thing to say that no state may torture pe-
riod, and another to say that no state may torture except when exigent cir-
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message is, in turn, directed not only inward, to the domestic
constituency, but also outward, to other nations and other in-
ternational actors.8' In addition to complying with a state's ob-
ligations under international law, 3 upholding and complying
with an absolute ban on torture sends a strong, unequivocal
message to countries around the world that such practices are
impermissible.84
Similarly, maintaining a commitment to an unconditional
ban on torture, even-in fact, precisely-in the face of a terror-
ist campaign aimed against a nation and its citizens and inter-
ests, facilitates the government's claim to the moral high
ground in the battle against the terrorists." Even in the post-
September 11 world, terrorism's most critical threat to democ-
ratic regimes lies in provoking the target nations to overreact
and employ authoritarian measures, such as interrogational
torture. In turn, such overreaction may weaken further moral
restraints against using force, 87 discredit the government do-
mestically and internationally, or alienate segments of the
population from the government, thereby making it even
harder to wage the fight against terrorism successfully. 88
cumstances require it."); Kremnitzer, supra note 39, at 253-54 (noting the
fundamental difference between qualitative and quantitative prohibitions).
82. See, e.g., Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The
Logic of Two-Level Games, 42 INTL ORG. 427 (1988) (discussing the notion of
two-level games in international relations).
83. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
84. Beharry v. Reno, 183 F. Supp. 2d 584, 601 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (Weinstein,
J.) ("The United States cannot expect to reap the benefits of internationally
recognized human rights ... without being willing to adhere to them itself. As
a moral leader of the world, the United States has obligated itself not to disre-
gard rights uniformly recognized by other nations."); DERSHOWITZ, supra note
18, at 145 ("[TIhe legitimation of torture by the world's leading democracy
would provide a welcome justification for its more widespread use in other
parts of the world."); Levinson, supra note 10, at 2052-53; Parry & White, su-
pra note 29, at 763.
85. See, e.g., Yehezkel Dror, Terrorism as a Challenge to the Democratic
Capacity to Govern, in TERRORISM, LEGITIMACY, AND POWER: THE
CONSEQUENCES OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE 65 (Martha Crenshaw ed., 1983).
86. David A. Charters, Introduction, in THE DEADLY SIN OF TERRORISM:
ITS EFFECTS ON DEMOCRACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES IN SIX COUNTRIES 1, 1
(David A. Charters ed., 1994) (suggesting that the most critical danger from
terrorism is "not that democracies would fail to defend themselves, but rather
that they would (and did) do so far too well-and, in so doing, became less de-
mocratic"); HEYMANN, supra note 75, at 159.
87. See, e.g., GRANT WARDLAW, POLITICAL TERRORISM: THEORIES,
TACTICS, AND COUNTER-MEASURES 69 (2d ed. 1989).
88. See, e.g., DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS 183-208 (2003). Posner and
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3. Strategy of resistance. The use of preventive interroga-
tional torture under certain extreme circumstances is inevita-
ble. If government agents perceive this tactic to be the only way
to procure critical information that they consider to be neces-
sary to foil an imminent massive terrorist attack, they are
likely to resort to such measures, whether they are legally
permissible or not. 9 However, even acknowledging that inevi-
tability, it still makes good sense to reject absolutely the use of
torture.90 As Frederick Schauer argues, "[r]esisting the inevita-
ble is not to be desired because it will prevent the inevitable,
but because it may be the best strategy for preventing what is
less inevitable but more dangerous." 9' What is "less inevitable
but more dangerous" may be the use of interrogational torture
in less-than-catastrophic cases or against persons who are not
"suspected terrorists." Once we legally authorize state agents to
use interrogational torture in one set of cases, it is unlikely
that we will be able to contain the authorization to that limited
subset. Such powers and authority will likely expand beyond
the scope of their originally intended use.
The insistence on an absolute legal ban on torture may also
slow the rush to resort to torture practices even in truly excep-
Vermeule have recently rejected that view, arguing that "terrorists succeed or
not in obtaining public support to the extent that the public prefers the terror-
ists' goals to the government's. Liberals who object to their own government's
use of repressive tactics are hardly likely to switch their allegiance to the ter-
rorists who deliberately provoked them." Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule,
Accommodating Emergencies, 56 STAN. L. REV. 605, 628 n.51 (2003). However,
their position seems to me to rely exclusively on a situation in which terrorism
is an entirely external threat to society and where that society is, relatively
speaking, homogeneous. Their focus on "liberals" is telling. Notably, this view
neglects to consider the effects of repressive governmental measures, taken in
the name of fighting terrorism, on specific minority groups that are ethnically,
religiously, or otherwise closer to the terrorists. It also runs contrary to much
historical experience. Thus, for example, the internment campaign that was
initiated by the British government on August 9, 1971, in Northern Ireland-
legally a part of the United Kingdom-has been widely recognized to be the
single most significant factor in the revival of the I.R.A. and other militant
Catholic paramilitary organizations in Northern Ireland. See, e.g., FIONNUALA
Ni AOLAIN, THE POLITICS OF FORCE 41 (2000); JOHN E. FINN, CONSTITUTIONS
IN CRISIS: POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND THE RULE OF LAW 68-71 (1991).
89. Yale Kamisar, Physician Assisted Suicide: The Problems Presented by
the Compelling, Heartwrenching Case, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1121,
1144-45 (1998).
90. Frederick Schauer, May Officials Think Religiously?, 27 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1075, 1084 (1986) (suggesting that under the strategy of resistance,
.one says 'no' even to the inevitable").
91. Id. at 1085.
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tional cases.92 Such an absolutist position constrains the use of
torture because it imposes moral inhibitions on government of-
ficials, raises the specter of public exposure and retribution if a
measure is subsequently determined unnecessary, and in cer-
tain situations, can result in criminal proceedings and civil
suits brought against the perpetrators.
4. The imbalance of balancing. It is easier to justify the use
of torture when engaging in "balancing." As Charles Black sug-
gested, "[a]s a matter of attitude, the language of 'balancing' is
apt language, easily conformable language, for the job of cut-
ting down to what somebody thinks is comfortable size the
claims to a sometimes awkward human freedom which the Bill
of Rights set out to protect."9 In the context of preventive inter-
rogational torture, any balancing act is going to be factually dif-
ficult to conduct and subject to inherent biases that would re-
sult in more, rather than less, torture.94
5. Slippery slopes. Slippery slope arguments constitute a
significant part of the absolutists' arsenal. They come in the fol-
lowing form: "if X then Y; Y is bad; therefore, even if X is good,
we must refrain from X because of Y,, 95 X is, in our context, al-
lowing the use of preventive interrogational torture in truly ex-
92. GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 178-79
(1982). Calabresi acknowledges the desire "in situations of uncertainty to slow
down change until we are sure we want it." Id. at 178. Additionally, he sug-
gests that "[t]he use of absolute or categorical language, even when it is inac-
curate and leads to inaccurate results, may have substantial merit for this...
reason." Id.
93. Black, supra note 78, at 66; see also CALABRESI, supra note 92, at 174;
Mordechai Kremnitzer, National Security and the Rule of Law: A Critique of
the Landau Commission's Report, in NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEMOCRACY IN
ISRAEL 153, 170-71 (Avner Yaniv ed., 1993) (arguing that if it is true that "in a
normal utilitarian balancing process the value of human dignity does not stand a
chance against the value of human life," then "the value of human dignity should
be protected by taking it out of the balance, making it... a part of natural law"
(quoting Winfried Hassemer)); Nagel, supra note 34, at 9 ("Once the door is
opened to calculations of utility and national interest, the usual speculations
about the future of freedom, peace, and economic prosperity can be brought to
bear to ease the consciences of those responsible for a certain number of
charred babies.").
94. See, e.g., Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent
Crises Always Be Constitutional?, 112 YALE L.J. 1011, 1035-42 (2003).
95. On slippery slopes, see generally Mario J. Rizzo & Douglas Glen
Whitman, The Camel's Nose Is in the Tent: Rules, Theories, and Slippery
Slopes, 51 UCLA L. REV. 539 (2003); Frederick Schauer, Slippery Slopes, 99
HARv. L. REV. 361 (1985); Eugene Volokh, The Mechanisms of the Slippery
Slope, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1026 (2003).
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ceptional cases.96 The feared Ys include, for example: 97 (1) use of
interrogation torture for nonpreventive purposes (including for
purposes of retribution and extrajudicial punishment);98 (2) use
of interrogational torture in less-than-truly-exceptional cases;
and (3) expansion of the use of interrogational torture beyond
the particular confines of antiterrorism, such as applying simi-
lar methods to "ordinary" criminals.
The risk of sliding down those slippery slopes has to do
with more than just the character of the individuals who are
likely to engage in acts of interrogational torture. In fact, it ex-
ists even if we assume that security services and their members
act in good faith and out of the purest motives when deciding
whether particular circumstances constitute a catastrophic
case that may justify or excuse interrogational torture99-an
assumption that many are unwilling to accept. This is so be-
cause of the creation of a constituency for torture,' 00 and the
general dilution of moral restraints in the relevant society.'O
Thus, assuming that torture may be deemed a more effective
96. The slippery slope argument is, in and of itself, a persuasion tactic
employed by absolutists. Indeed, if one considers any use of interrogational
torture to have negative moral value, then the issue is not one of slippery slopes.
Rather, the argument is one that runs against "the instant case" since the use of
torture, even preventive interrogational torture in truly catastrophic cases, al-
ready places the community in the "danger case." See Schauer, supra note 95, at
365-66.
97. See, e.g., Kreimer, supra note 17, at 319-21; Kremnitzer, supra note
39, at 261-63.
98. Thus, for example, an argument could be made that a short but pain-
ful punishment by way of using torture against convicted felons may be better,
as far as deterrence is concerned, than imposing long sentences on such indi-
viduals. See Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Does Criminal Law Deter? A
Behavioral Science Investigation, OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. (forthcoming 2004)
(manuscript at 14-15, on file with author).
99. Consider, for example, the description by the Landau Commission of
the investigation staff of the GSS as
characterized by professionalism, devotion to duty, readiness to un-
dergo exhausting working conditions at all hours of the day and night
and to confront physical danger, but above all by high inner motiva-
tion to serve the nation and the State in secret activity, with "duty be-
ing its own reward," without the public glory which comes with pub-
licity.
Landau Report, supra note 2, at 148.
100. See, e.g., Langbein, supra note 73, at 13 (suggesting that, "once legiti-
mated, torture could develop a constituency with a vested interest in perpetu-
ating it").
101. See, e.g., Kadish, supra note 27, at 353 ("[Tlhe legitimation of repug-
nant practices in special cases inevitably loosens antipathy to them in all
cases.").
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interrogation technique than its alternatives, we can expect
members of security services to become increasingly more de-
pendent on the use of such coercive techniques in specific cases,
justifying categorization of a larger number of cases as catas-
trophic. Their careers depending on their ability to foil future
attacks, interrogators are likely, when they believe they can get
away with it, to opt for those interrogation methods that are
deemed to provide the fastest answers. °2 And what starts off as
using exceptional methods in exceptional circumstances may,
with time, be internalized and applied in a growing number of
cases.' 3 "So it always happens that whenever a wrong principle
of conduct, political or personal, is adopted on a plea of neces-
sity, it will be afterwards followed on a plea of convenience." 4
6. Identity of those subject to torture. Consider the notion of
the "war on terrorism." War is the ultimate emergency, an
emergency in which "no sacrifice is excessive."105 But as David
Cole argued, what is really sacrificed are mostly the rights of
"others"-aliens, immigrants, foreigners-not our own rights
and liberties. The clearer the distinction and division be-
tween "us" and "them" and the greater the threat "they" pose to
"us," the greater is our willingness to accept use of more radical
measures by the government against "them." We allow for more
repressive measures when we believe that those will not be
102. HEYMANN, supra note 75, at 110.
103. Gross, supra note 94, at 1092-94.
104. Juilliard v. Greenman, 110 U.S. 421, 458 (1884) (Field, J., dissenting).
105. SUSAN SONTAG, AIDS AND ITS METAPHORS 11 (1989).
106. COLE, supra note 88, at 5-6; see also Oren Gross, On Terrorists and
Other Criminals: States of Emergency and the Criminal Legal System, in
DIRECTIONS IN CRIMINAL LAW: INQUIRIES IN THE THEORY OF CRIMINAL LAW
409 (Eli Lederman ed., 2001) (suggesting that reference to terrorists as "oth-
ers" leads to greater acceptance of sweeping governmental emergency powers);
Ileana M. Porras, On Terrorism: Reflections on Violence and the Outlaw, 1994
UTAH L. REV. 119 (discussing descriptions of terrorists as "foreign" and
"other"); Natsu Taylor Saito, Crossing the Border: The Interdependence of For-
eign Policy and Racial Justice in the United States, 1 YALE HUM. RTs. & DEV.
L.J. 53, 57-59 (1998) (detailing the "us against them" mentality in national
security policy); Note, Blown Away? The Bill of Rights After Oklahoma City,
109 HARV. L. REV. 2074, 2091 (1996) ("The majority may be willing to accept
broad, vaguely defined law enforcement powers when the minority's constitu-
tional rights are at stake. .. ." (citations omitted)); Huong Vu, Note, Us
Against Them: The Path to National Security Is Paved by Racism, 50 DRAKE L.
REV. 661, 663 (2002) (describing how U.S. national security policy singles out
nonwhite citizens and legal residents as possible security risks); Ronald
Dworkin, The Threat to Patriotism, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Feb. 28, 2002, at 44.
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turned against us in the future. 10 7 This is certainly true in the
context of interrogational torture, where the perception is that
torture is "reserved" for "others" and that the distinction be-
tween "us" and those "others," namely the terrorists, is clear-
est. 08 While the benefits that derive from its application (e.g.,
preventing particular terrorist attacks) accrue to all members
of society, its heavy costs are borne by a distinct, smaller, and
ostensibly well-defined group of people. 09 The danger is that
the state will tend to strike a balance disproportionately in fa-
vor of security and impose too much of a cost on the target
group without facing much resistance (and, in fact, receiving
strong support) from the general public."'
107. Gross, supra note 94, at 1082-83.
108. Soon after the attacks of September 11, President Bush declared, "Ei-
ther you are with us or you are with the terrorists." President Bush's Address
on Terrorism Before a Joint Meeting of Congress, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2001,
at B4; see also David W. Chen & Somini Sengupta, Not Yet Citizens but Eager
to Fight for the U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2001, at Al (reporting on legal per-
manent resident enlistment in the armed services post-September 11 due in
part to "'an us versus them thing [as] ... children of immigrants feel a need to
assert which side of the line they are on'" (quoting Hunter College sociologist
Philip Kasinitz)).
109. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 27 (1971). As one writer
noted, Rawls's distributive argument against utilitarianism "is far more com-
pelling in the interrogation context, in which one person might be put in com-
plete agony, rather than simply denied some benefit in exchange for a slight
enhancement of the personal security enjoyed by all other individuals in the
community." Donald A. Dripps, Against Police Interrogation-And the Privi-
lege Against Self-Incrimination, 78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 699, 720 n.87
(1988). Arguments that such distributive justice effects of torture can be ad-
dressed within, for example, utilitarianism tend to come in two forms: first,
extra weight may be given to the interests and the rights of those who are
worst-off; second, distributive concerns ought to be taken into account in set-
ting the cost-benefit analysis pertaining to the overall outcome. See, e.g., Scan-
lon, supra note 69, at 79-82. However, as a matter of theory it would be ex-
tremely difficult, if not impossible, to determine the identity of those who are
made worst-off by resort to torture. Obviously that group includes those who
are subjected to such practices, but, as noted above, the torturers and society
at large also suffer certain loss from using torture. Moreover, as a practical
matter, it is highly unlikely that the interests of those made worst-off (assum-
ing we focus here on those actually tortured or threatened with torture) will,
in fact, be accorded extra weight. See, e.g., Gross, supra note 94, at 1037.
110. See William J. Stuntz, Local Policing After the Terror, 111 YALE L.J.
2137, 2164-65 (2002). Stuntz argues that violent crises tend to result in situa-
tions where the cost bearers are sufficiently few and powerless, or have certain
substantial, perhaps even insurmountable, barriers to their coalescing to fight
the government's actions. Id. at 2165 n.87. "Anytime the government does
something that has concentrated costs but diffused benefits, there is a danger
that it will do too much-harming one voter to please ten is generally thought
to be a good deal from the point of view of politically accountable decisionmak-
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Furthermore, times of great danger (real or perceived)
bring about a confluence of two mutually reinforcing trends,
namely the tendency of the public to fear and hysteria, and na-
tivistic tendencies that are reflected in an "intense opposition to
an internal minority on the ground of its foreign (i.e., 'un-
American') connections.""1 Under such circumstances, use of
torture may function to create an "illusory sense of overcoming
vulnerability by the thorough domination of others." 2
However, reliance on the separation between "us" and
"them" only provides us with a false, illusory sense of security.
History and experience teach us that what we do to others to-
day will be done to us tomorrow." 3 Thus, if for no other reason
than self-interest, those that are trigger-happy when it comes
to using torture in interrogations of suspected terrorists in the
name of national security must be wary of history's lessons.
Counterterrorism measures tend to expand and extend over
time beyond their original, "limited" goals and specific targets.
The only realistic barrier against governmental abuse of
powers in the context of interrogational torture may be setting
an absolute legal prohibition on such practices. Even if a legal
prohibition prevents what may be deemed as necessary action
in certain situations, this cost may be worth paying, e.g., due to
the small probability of such cases arising, further discounted
by the small probability that government is unable to deal with
them effectively by utilizing available legal measures. Fur-
thermore, such cost may be negligible in comparison with the
greater costs entailed in the far more probable abuse of powers
by the government in a broader-and arguably more realistic-
set of cases.
II. CATASTROPHIC CASES
To deny the use of preventive interrogational torture, even
when there is good reason to believe that a massive bomb is
ticking away in a crowded mall, is as cold hearted as it is to
permit torture in the first place. It is cold hearted because, in
true catastrophic cases, the failure to use preventive interroga-
tional torture will result in the death of a great number of in-
ers." Id. at 2165.
111. JOHN HIGHAM, STRANGERS IN THE LAND 4 (1971).
112. John T. Parry, What Is Torture, Are We Doing It, and What If We Are?,
64 U. PITT. L. REV. 237, 247 (2003).




nocent people. Upholding the rights of the suspect will negate
the rights, including the very fundamental right to life, of inno-
cent victims. I agree with Sissela Bok's observation that "it is a
very narrow view of responsibility which does not also take
some blame for a disaster one could easily have averted, no
matter how much others are also to blame."
114
As the Landau Commission suggested, to deny the use of
preventive interrogational torture in such cases is also hypo-
critical: experience tells us that when faced with serious
threats to the life of the nation, government--any govern-
ment-will take whatever measures it deems necessary to
abate the crisis.1 5 In her opinion in Barzilai v. Government of
Israel, Justice Ben-Porat of the Israeli Supreme Court wrote:
[We, as judges who "dwell among our people," should not harbour
any illusions .... There simply are cases in which those who are at
the helm of the State, and bear responsibility for its survival and se-
curity, regard certain deviations from the law for the sake of protect-
ing the security of the State, as an unavoidable necessity.'
1 6
Ignoring the real-life consequences of catastrophic cases
may result in portrayal of the legal system as unrealistic and
inadequate. As a result, particular norms, and perhaps the le-
gal system in general, may break down, as the ethos of obedi-
ence to law is seriously shaken and challenges emerge with re-
spect to the reasonableness of following these norms. Thus,
legal rigidity in the face of severe crises is not merely hypocriti-
cal; it may be detrimental to long-term notions of the rule of
law. It may also lead to more, rather than less, radical interfer-
ence with individual rights and liberties."7 A conditional ban on
114. SISSELA BOK, LYING 41-42 (2d ed. 1999).
115. See Landau Report, supra note 2, at 183; ARTHUR KOESTLER, PROMISE
AND FULFILMENT, PALESTINE 1917-1949, at 134 (1949) ("It is impossible to
fight ruthlessness with considerateness, guile with sincerity. Opponents in
battle, like partners in understanding, must meet on a common plane-which
is inevitably that of their lowest common denominator."); Kamisar, supra note
89, at 1144-45.
116. H.C. 463/86, Barzilai v. Gov't of Israel, 40(3) (1986) P.D. 505, reprinted
in 6 SELECTED JUDGMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF ISRAEL 1, 63 (1988); see
also Dershowitz, supra note 22, at 192 ("We know, of course, what all govern-
ments would actually do under these conditions of tragic choice: they (or more
precisely, some flack-catching underling) would torture (with the implicit ap-
proval of the powers-that-be). But could the government justify it?").
117. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J.
1029, 1030 (2004) ("If respect for civil liberties requires governmental paraly-
sis, serious politicians will not hesitate before sacrificing rights to the war
against terrorism. They will only gain popular applause by brushing civil lib-
ertarian objections aside as quixotic.").
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torture imposes high social and individual costs, but so too does
an absolute ban.
An uncompromising absolute prohibition on torture sets
unrealistic standards that no one can hope to meet when faced
with extremely exigent circumstances. Such unrealistic stan-
dards would, in fact, either be ineffective or would be perceived
as setting double standards. The drafters of the Model Penal
Code identify the problem when they suggest that duress ought
to be made a valid defense to all criminal charges because:
law is ineffective in the deepest sense, indeed ... it is hypocritical, if
it imposes on the actor who has the misfortune to confront a dilem-
matic choice, a standard that his judges are not prepared to affirm
that they should and could comply with if their turn to face the prob-
lem should arise. Condemnation in such a case is bound to be an inef-
fective threat; what is, however, more significant is that it is divorced
from any moral base and is unjust."u
In fact, even if each of us, as individual moral agents, sup-
ported an absolute prohibition on torture, we would still not
want those we entrust with keeping us safe from harm to be
strictly bound by similar constraints.19 We want our leaders
and public officials to possess the highest moral character, but I
do not believe we want them to be brazen Kantians. Recall
Kant's celebrated example of an unconditional duty, i.e., the
duty to tell the truth. According to Kant, the duty to tell the
truth is not suspended even when an assassin (A) asks a person
(B) whether he knows the whereabouts of a friend of B, whom A
wishes to murder.2 0 I agree with Sissela Bok that "[a] world
where it is improper even to tell a lie to a murderer pursuing
an innocent victim is not a world that many would find safe to
inhabit."121 Very few people would want to have as a friend
someone who tells the murderer the truth rather than lie and
118. 1 MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 2.09, at 374-75 (1985);
see also Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, Law in the Heart of Darkness: Atrocity &
Duress, 43 VA. J. INT'L L. 861 (2003); Valerie Epps, The Soldier's Obligation to
Die When Ordered to Shoot Civilians or Face Death Himself, 37 NEW ENG. L.
REV. 987 (2003).
119. Michael Walzer, Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands, in WAR
AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 34, at 62, 63-64.
120. Immanuel Kant, On a Supposed Right to Lie from Altruistic Motives,
in CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON AND OTHER WRITINGS IN MORAL
PHILOSOPHY 346-50 (Lewis White Beck ed. & trans., 1949). According to Kant,
B may respond to A's question with silence, but is not justified in telling a lie
to A in order to save B's friend. Kant argues that if B tells the truth to A, and
A goes on to murder B's friend, B will not be held morally liable for the nega-
tive consequences of his response to A. See id.
121. BOK, supra note 114, at 42.
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save her friend. Similarly, few would want a leader who follows
Kant's absolutist views to their extreme rather than act to save
the lives of innocent civilians. As Judge Posner aptly put it, "if
the stakes are high enough, torture is permissible. No one who
doubts that this is the case should be in a position of responsi-
bility."122 Similarly, Michael Walzer, who considers injunction
against torture to form part of a set of standards to which all
societies can be held, 123 suggests that a moral politician is rec-
ognized by "his dirty hands."14 Faced with a catastrophic case,
a moral person who is not a political leader, i.e., who does not
bear the burden of actual decision making, would refuse to act
in an immoral way and embrace an absolutist perspective. She
would keep her hands clean. A public official who is immoral
would merely pretend that her hands were clean (e.g., by re-
sorting to interrogational torture but lying about it and denying
the use of torture). A moral official would do the right thing to
save innocent lives, while openly acknowledging and recogniz-
ing that such actions are (morally) wrong-that is, openly ad-
mitting that her hands are indeed dirty. The question then be-
comes not whether state agents will use preventive
interrogational torture in the face of a moral principle to the
contrary (they will), but rather what moral judgment and legal
effect should accompany such action.
The catastrophic case presents the open-minded absolutist
with a truly tragic choice. Relegating the extreme case to mere
irrelevance does not make the choice less tragic, nor does it
make a real problem "go away." A meaningful solution to the
legal and moral dilemmas presented to us by the catastrophic
case depends on acknowledging, and accounting for, all the
relevant values and interests.
Absolutists that face the dilemmatic choices that catastro-
phic cases present often focus on redefining the scope of appli-
cability of the prohibition on torture or the scope of the dilem-
matic choices presented by the catastrophic case. For example,
they may engage in definitional balancing, carving out rela-
tively narrow definitions of, or relatively broad exceptions to,
122. Richard A. Posner, The Best Offense, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 2,
2002, at 28, 30 (reviewing DERSHOWITZ, supra note 18).
123. Michael Walzer, Moral Minimalism, in FROM THE TWILIGHT OF
PROBABILITY: ETHICS AND POLITICS 3, 9 (William R. Shea & Antonio Spada-
fora eds., 1992); MICHAEL WALZER, THICK AND THIN: MORAL ARGUMENT AT
HOME AND ABROAD 10(1994).
124. Walzer, supra note 119, at 70.
1514 [Vol 88:1481
2004] ARE TORTURE WARRANTS WARRANTED? 1515
the relevant rights and duties."5 Accordingly, it may still be
possible to contend that the prohibition on torture is absolute
when applied, while conceding that it is not applicable to every
situation.' For example, Alan Gewirth answers affirmatively
the question whether there are absolute rights by using, as his
leading example, the right of a mother not to be tortured to
death by her son. 127 Similarly, supporters of an absolutist per-
spective may argue that certain measures taken by government
agents in specific catastrophic cases did not amount to "torture"
and thus did not violate the fundamental prohibition. 128 In a
125. Black, supra note 78, at 97 (explaining that absolutism is understood
as balancing which is limited to definition of the scope of a right). For a de-
fense of limitations on the scope of absolute rights as a means to minimize the
moral conflict see Russ Shafer-Landau, Specifying Absolute Rights, 37 ARIz. L.
REV. 209 (1995).
126. Frederick Schauer, Speech and "Speech"-Obscenity and "Obscenity":
An Exercise in the Interpretation of Constitutional Language, 67 GEO. L.J. 899,
903 (1979) ("[Albsolute in force is not the same as unlimited in range.").
127. Gewirth, supra note 46, at 8. Gewirth further extends the right not to
be so tortured to include other subjects and respondents such as "fathers,
daughters, wives, husbands, grandparents, cousins, and friends." Id. at 15. In-
flicting extreme harm on any of those would be "an ultimate act of betrayal,"
the performance (indeed, the contemplation of performance) of which would
cause the actor to "lose all self-respect" and regard her life as "no longer worth
living." Id. at 8. He then goes on to extend the same rationale to all other cases
of torture. Id. at 15-16. However, it is unclear how persuasive this extended
argument is in light of his heavy emphasis on the special relations between
son and mother.
128. See, e.g., Levinson, supra note 10, at 2036-41; Is Torture Ever Justi-
fred?, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 11, 2003, at 9 (expressing support for strict ad-
herence, even at heavy cost, by the prohibition against torture, which "ex-
presses one of the West's most powerful taboos," but accepting, at the same
time, that "vigorous questioning short of torture-prolonged interrogations,
mild sleep deprivation, perhaps the use of truth serum" may be justified in
some cases). Defending his generally absolutist attitude, Charles Black argued
that limiting balancing to the question of defining the scope of a right would
tend to narrow the possibility of limiting that right itself since at some point
the definition would take on a "strained and unnatural flavor, outraging the
common usages of the language." Black, supra note 78, at 96. An example of
such outrage is evident in Lord Gardiner's minority report as a member of the
Parker Committee in the United Kingdom. Report of the Committee of Privy
Counselors Appointed to Consider Authorized Procedures for the Interrogation
of Persons Suspected of Terrorism, 1972, Cmnd. 4901, at 11-22 [hereinafter
Parker Report]. The early 1970s saw the emergence of persistent allegations of
torture and inhuman and degrading conduct against persons undergoing in-
terrogation by the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) and army interrogators
in Northern Ireland. Public outrage over the allegations led to the appoint-
ment of a committee, headed by the British Ombudsman, Sir Edmund Comp-
ton, to investigate certain allegations of physical brutality by the security
forces. Report of the Enquiry into Allegations Against the Security Forces of
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similar vein, many writers have developed distinctions to de-
termine the extent to which the general prohibition on torture
is applicable. One example is Philippa Foot's distinction be-
tween "what one does or causes and what one merely allows."129
Under this distinction, one would violate the ban on torture by
torturing another. However, the ban would not be violated
when we allow torture to take place in circumstances where we
cannot prevent some torture from happening and opt to mini-
mize the social costs by, for example, choosing to save a greater
number of individuals from being tortured. 130
Many have sought to resolve the dilemma by conceding
that the catastrophic case calls for a special, exceptional treat-
ment. While the nature of such exceptional treatment may be
the subject of further debate-for example, as to whether it
calls for the suspension or qualification of otherwise applicable
moral norms or whether such general moral norms continue to
apply even to the exceptional case, which is still recognized as
creating exceptional circumstances-the significant point is
recognizing the need to engage in this debate and acknowledg-
ing the relevance and significance of the catastrophic case.
Physical Brutality in Northern Ireland Arising Out of the Events of 9th August,
1971, 1971, Cmnd. 4823, at iii. The Compton Report, submitted in November
1971, concluded that RUC interrogators have resorted to an "interrogation in
depth" of some individuals. Id. at 21-23. "Interrogation in depth" consisted of
the combination of some or all of five techniques of disorientation and sensory
deprivation. Id. The Compton Report chose to declare that such interrogation
techniques constituted "physical ill-treatment," but did not amount to "physi-
cal brutality." Id. at 23. The Report defined "physical brutality" as "an inhu-
man or savage form of cruelty, and that cruelty implies a disposition to inflict
suffering, coupled with indifference to, or pleasure in, the victim's pain." Id.
The Parker Committee was appointed shortly after the publication of the
Compton Report. Whereas the Compton Committee was assigned the task of
reviewing certain allegations about past conduct, the Parker Committee was
charged with evaluating the overall procedures pertaining to the interrogation
of suspected terrorists. In his minority report as a member of the Parker
Committee, Lord Gardiner sharply criticized the Compton Report's notion of
"brutality":
Under this definition, which some of our witnesses thought came from
the Inquisition, if an interrogator believed, to his great regret, that it
was necessary for him to cut off the fingers of a detainee one by one to
get the required information out of him for the sole purpose of saving
life, this would not be cruel and, because not cruel, not brutal.
Parker Report, supra, at 13.
129. Philippa Foot, The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Ef-
fect, 5 OXFORD REV. 15 (1967), reprinted in PHILIPPA FOOT, VIRTUES AND
VICES 19, 26 (1978).
130. See id. at 28. For discussion of other distinctions see Moore, supra
note 38, at 299-312.
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Consider Charles Fried's general argument that rights
may be absolute within their scope of application.' He ac-
knowledges, however, that this argument runs into difficulties
when applied to a case "where killing an innocent person may
save a whole nation."132 Fried concedes that "[in such cases it
seems fanatical to maintain the absoluteness of the judgment,
to do right even if the heavens will in fact fall." 33 The regular
norms that ought to apply in ordinary times lead to a "fanati-
cal" result when made to apply in exceptional situations. Fried
resolves the tension between the general absolutist view of
rights and the relativist approach taken in such "extreme
cases" by appealing to the notion of the "catastrophic" case and
regarding it as "a distinct concept just because it identifies the
extreme situations in which the usual categories of judgment
(including the category of right and wrong) no longer apply.' 34
It is precisely for this reason that Fried speaks of categorical
131
norms of right and wrong, rather than of absolute norms.
Fried's argument about the catastrophic case implicitly ac-
knowledges that legal norms presuppose the existence of a
"normal" state of affairs and remain applicable as long as this
state of affairs continues to exist. Accordingly, "[t]his effective
normal situation is not a mere 'superficial presupposition' that
a jurist can ignore; that situation belongs precisely to [the
norm's] immanent validity."1 6 In the catastrophic case, when
the underlying normal state of affairs is fundamentally inter-
rupted, the relevant norms may no longer be applicable as is
and cannot fulfill their ordinary regulatory function. "For a le-
gal order to make sense, a normal situation must exist ....
General norms are limited in their scope of application to those
circumstances in which the normal state of affairs prevails. Ca-
tastrophes undermine this factual basis. Thus, Fried's solution
to the conundrum of the catastrophic case treats that case as
governed by a wholly different set of "categories of judgment,"
131. CHARLES FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG (1978).
132. Id. at 10.
133. Id.
134. Id. (emphasis added); see also Aleinikoff, supra note 42, at 1000.
135. See FRIED, supra note 131, at 10-11. This type of argument enables
Fried to claim that although extreme cases may invoke conduct that does not
comport with the relevant categorical right, that fact, in and of itself, does not
prove the absence of an absolute, central core of that right. Id. at 10, 31.
136. CARL SCHMITT, POLITICAL THEOLOGY: FOUR CHAPTERS ON THE




thus resolving the 'tension by removing one component-the
prohibition on torture-from the equation.
Charles Black, another thoughtful advocate of absolutist
prescriptions, suggested that speaking of an absolute right not
to be tortured "most faithfully approximates and renders the
attitudes and probable actions of most decent people when it
comes to torture.""8 However, while generally defending an ab-
solutist view of constitutional rights against balancing argu-
ments, Black also recognized that the right not to be tortured
could not be absolute. The ticking bomb scenario undermined,
in his opinion, any credible argument to that effect. 139 Black
reconciles his general attitude with the particular case of inter-
rogational torture by suggesting that the absolutist position
means that justifications for infringing rights should be disre-
garded unless they rise to an altogether different order of mag-
nitude from usual prudential considerations. 4 0 Under this "or-
ders of magnitude" approach, the absolute prohibition sets out
a strong presumption against the use of torture. However, that
presumption is rebuttable. Yet, in order to refute the presump-
tion in any given case a showing must be made of the excep-
tional magnitude of the risk involved.' 4' Only in such extreme
cases may the fundamental presumption against the use of tor-
ture be overcome. In all other cases, torture is banned.'
138. Black, supra note 78, at 67.
139. See id.
140. Id. at 67-68.
141. Black seems to focus on the number of innocent lives that are at stake
in the catastrophic case as the decisive factor in determining the order of
magnitude of the risk involved while taking the probability of that risk mate-
rializing as constant. Cf. Posner, supra note 34 (manuscript at 4) ("[The less
certain is the need for or the expected efficacy of torture, the more lives have
to be at risk to justify it. . . ."). Posner apparently supports the use of torture
even when only one life is at stake, provided that there is no alternative
method of extracting critical information, which is needed to save that life. Id.
142. See Black, supra note 78, at 67-68. Black's approach here is somewhat
similar to Fred Schauer's "presumptive positivism." SCHAUER, supra note 53,
at 196-97. According to Schauer, decision makers generally follow rules, and
consider overriding those only in "particularly exigent circumstances." Id. at
196. Thus, there exists a strong presumption for rule-based decision making.
However, that presumption may be overcome in exceptional circumstances. It
is worth noting that this version of presumptive positivism also introduces a
certain degree of flexibility into rule-based decision making, enabling it to deal
with the challenge of rule worship. Not surprisingly, Schauer accepts the pos-
sibility that "unexpected and truly horrific cases" serve as exceptions to any
theory about the categorical nature of rights. Frederick Schauer, A Comment
on the Structure of Rights, 27 GA. L. REV. 415, 424 (1993); see also Kadish, su-
pra note 27, at 346.
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Others, such as Ronald Dworkin,'4 3 Robert Nozick,1"4 Mi-14614
chael Walzer, 5 Thomas Nagel, 6 Michael Moore, 47 and Martha
Nussbaum, 4 8 have similarly recognized the catastrophic case as
one to which their respective general theories either do not ap-
ply entirely or are applicable subject to necessary modifica-
tions.
Thus, there are two perspectives from which to approach
the question of preventive interrogational torture: the general
policy perspective and the perspective of the catastrophic case.
Both perspectives are valuable and relevant. Focusing on one to
the exclusion of the other is misguided. However, we must not
use the two perspectives simultaneously. Instead, I suggest
that the primary perspective ought to be the general one,
which, as indicated above, supports an absolute legal ban on
torture for a combination of moral and pragmatic considera-
tions. Once this general policy is set in place, we should attend
to the real problems that the catastrophic case presents. But
can we really examine preventive interrogational torture from
both perspectives and still make a coherent, morally and le-
gally defensible argument? I believe we can.
III. OFFICIAL DISOBEDIENCE
I peg my belief on the twin notions of pragmatic absolutism
and official disobedience. Part I dealt with the former, the
claim that an absolute ban on torture is the right thing to do
143. Ronald Dworkin, The Rights of Myron Farber, N.Y. REV. BOOKs, Oct.
26, 1978, at 34 (arguing that although policy must yield to principle when the
two argue in opposite directions, this may be qualified to the extent that "con-
siderations of policy are of dramatic importance, so that the community will
suffer a catastrophe if they are ignored").
144. NOZICK, supra note 48, at 30 n.* ("The question of whether.., side
constraints are absolute, or whether they may be violated in order to avoid
catastrophic moral horror, and if the latter, what the resulting structure
might look like, is one I hope largely to avoid.").
145. Walzer, supra note 119.
146. Nagel, supra note 34, at 6 ("[While it is certainly right to adhere to
absolutist restrictions unless the utilitarian considerations favoring violation
are overpoweringly weighty and extremely certain-nevertheless, when that
special condition is met, it may become impossible to adhere to an absolutist
position.").
147. Moore, supra note 38.
148. Press, supra note 72 (quoting an e-mail from Professor Nussbaum to
The Nation in which Nussbaum suggests, "I don't think any sensible moral




when we wed moral and pragmatic considerations. This part
adds to the discussion the argument that the way to reconcile
an absolute ban with the necessities of the catastrophic case,
discussed in Part II, is not through any means of legal accom-
modation-including the one advocated by Professor Dershow-
itz 14 9-but rather through a mechanism of official disobedience.
In circumstances amounting to a catastrophic case, the appro-
priate method of tackling extremely grave national dangers and
threats may entail going outside the legal order, at times even
violating otherwise accepted constitutional principles.
When catastrophic cases occur, governments and their
agents are likely to do whatever is necessary to neutralize the
threat, whether legal or not. Yet, to say that the authorities are
going to use preventive interrogational torture in catastrophic
cases is not the same thing as saying that they should be au-
thorized to do so through a priori, ex ante legal rules. It is ex-
tremely dangerous to provide for such eventualities and such
awesome powers within the framework of the existing legal
system primarily because of the enormous risks of contamina-
tion and manipulation of that system, and the deleterious mes-
sage involved in legalizing such actions. ' 5°
Like everybody else, officials should obey the law, even
when they disagree with specific legal commands. However,
there may be extreme exigencies where officials may regard
strict obedience to legal authority (e.g., an absolute legal ban on
torture) irrational or immoral.'5 ' Absolutists-in this context,
those who insist on an unqualified rule of obedience-would re-
solve the official's dilemma in such cases by finding that her ob-
ligation to obey legal authority is undiminished by the extreme
exigency. Some consequentialists may argue that the decision
whether to obey ought to be made on a case-by-case basis, care-
fully comparing the relative costs and benefits of each alterna-
tive. As Part I observed, both of these extreme positions are
subject to critical challenges.
One possible pragmatic middle position is to regard the
rule of obedience as establishing a strong presumption in favor
149. See infra Part V.
150. Brownile, supra note 11, at 507 ("To try to make the law accommo-
date... crude necessities.., is rather like peopling a monastery with prosti-
tutes and publishing the mere change of lodging as an exemplary rehabilita-
tion.").
151. Frederick Schauer, The Questions of Authority, 81 GEO. L.J. 95, 110-
15 (1992).
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of obedience that is rebuttable in exceptional cases where the
wrong of disobedience is outweighed by the greater wrong that
would follow from obeying the rules.15 While avoiding many of
the pitfalls of both the absolutist and consequentialist perspec-
tives, such a "presumptive" approach is not without its own dif-
ficulties. There is the problem of oscillation between the oppos-
ing poles of rule-based and particularistic decision making. The
harder the presumption is to overcome, the more rule-based-
like it becomes with all the attendant problems of rule-based
decision making; the easier it is to override the rule of obedi-
ence, the less meaningful it becomes, with the risk of collapsing
the presumption into a mere exercise in particularistic, contex-
tual decision making.
The possibility of a lawful override of the rule, under the
presumptive approach, compounds the problem further."' That
is, in appropriate circumstances, deviating from the rule may
be not only morally permissible, but legally acceptable as well.
The presumptive approach may fail to present adequate safe-
guards where we have reasons to believe that errors by public
officials that result in overuse of torture are going to be more
socially costly than errors related to underuse of torture. Even
more significantly, the presumptive approach fails to provide
strong enough incentives for officials to play by the rule of obe-
dience rather than justify overriding that rule in a particular
case. In the absence of an absolute ban on torture, public offi-
cials are left with a "weighted presumption" that may not be
amenable to enforcement through sanctions.5 4
152. Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitu-
tional Interpretation, 110 HARv. L. REV. 1359, 1382-83 (1997) (suggesting that
the general rule of obedience may be overridden under certain circumstances).
Alexander and Schauer's "rule of obedience" requires public officials to obey
the Constitution as it is interpreted by the Supreme Court, regardless of
whether or not they agree with the Court's particular interpretations. Id. Al-
though presenting a case for an unqualified rule of judicial supremacy, Alex-
ander and Schauer also concede that President Lincoln was right to challenge
the Court's ruling in the Dred Scott case. Id.; see also Schauer, supra note 151,
at 103 (suggesting "the idea of overridable obligations that survive the over-
ride despite being overridden in a particular case"). The idea of a rule of obedi-
ence as a strong presumption follows similar contours to Schauer's "presump-
tive positivism." See supra note 142.
153. Alexander & Schauer, supra note 152, at 1382-83.
154. Emily Sherwin, Ducking Dred Scott: A Response to Alexander and
Schauer, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 65, 70 (1998) (arguing that while a "serious
rule of obedience" has the advantage of determinate application,
"[dietermining whether a decision-maker deserves to be sanctioned for viola-
tion of a weighted presumption is a far more complex task").
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The proposed model of official disobedience is another mid-
dle ground between the diametrically opposed poles of absolut-
ism and consequentialist conditionalism. However, it alleviates
some of the concerns associated with the presumptive model.
Most significantly, it raises the costs of rule deviation for public
officials while, at the same time, maintaining a strong com-
mitment to law abidingness, in general, and to strict adherence
to the absolute ban on torture, in particular.
The model of official disobedience calls upon public officials
having to deal with catastrophic cases to consider the possibil-
ity of acting outside the legal order while openly acknowledging
their actions and the extralegal nature of such actions.155 The
officials must assume the risks involved in acting extralegally.
Rather than recognize ex ante the possibility of a lawful over-
ride of the general prohibition on torture, as suggested by the
presumptive approach, official disobedience focuses on the ab-
solute nature of the ban while accepting the possibility that an
official who deviates from the rule may escape sanctions in ex-
ceptional circumstances.
Consider again the possibility of extreme circumstances
where officials may regard strict obedience to legal authority as
irrational or immoral because of a contextual rebalancing of
values that takes places at a level that is antecedent to the
relevant legal rule itself, i.e., the level of the rule's underlying
reasons or similar first-order, content-dependent reasons that
relate to obedience to the rule.' According to the official dis-
obedience model, if an official determines that a particular case
necessitates her deviation from a relevant rule, she may choose
to depart from the rule. But at the time she acts extralegally,
she will not know what the personal consequences of violating
the rule are going to be. Not only does the basic rule continue to
apply to other situations (that is, it is not canceled or termi-
nated), it is not even overridden (from a legal perspective at
least) in the concrete case at hand. Rule departure constitutes,
under all circumstances and all conditions, a violation of the
relevant legal rule. Yet, whether the actor would be punished
for her violation remains a separate question.'57 Society, as the
155. See generally Gross, supra note 94, at 1096-1113 (discussing the ex-
tra-legal measures model in the context of emergency powers).
156. See SCHAUER, supra note 53, at 128; Heidi M. Hurd, Challenging Au-
thority, 100 YALE L.J. 1611, 1625-28 (1991) (discussing the paradox of practi-
cal authority); Schauer, supra note 151, at 110-15.
157. But see Sherwin, supra note 154, at 70-71 (arguing that "the ultimate
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imposer of authority, retains the role of making the final de-
termination whether the actor ought to be punished and re-
buked, or rewarded and commended for her actions. It should
be up to society as a whole, "the people," to decide how to re-
spond ex post to extralegal actions taken by government offi-
cials in response to extreme exigencies. The people may decide
to hold the actor accountable for the wrongfulness of her ac-
tions, or may approve them retrospectively. Thus, even when
acting to advance the public good under circumstances of great
necessity, officials remain answerable to the public for their ex-
tralegal actions. Justice Jackson was right to suggest that
"[t]he chief restraint upon those who command the physical
forces of the country ... must be their responsibility to the po-
litical judgments of their contemporaries and to the moral
judgments of history."158 At the end of the day, it is those politi-
cal, moral, and-one may add to the list-legal judgments of
the public that serve as the real restraint on public officials.
Society may determine that the use of torture in any given
case, even when couched in terms of preventing future catas-
trophes, is abhorrent, unjustified, and inexcusable. In such a
case, the acting official may be called to answer for her actions
and make legal and political amends. She may, for example,
need to resign her position,59 face criminal charges or civil
suits, or be subject to impeachment proceedings. Alternatively,
the people may approve the actions and ratify them. Such rati-
fication may be formal or informal, legal as well as social or po-
litical. Legal modes of ratification include, for example, the ex-
ercise of prosecutorial discretion not to bring criminal charges
160against persons accused of using torture, jury nullification
where criminal charges are brought, executive pardoning or
clemency where criminal proceedings result in conviction,' 161
duty to obey will never be greater than the combined effect of formal and in-
formal sanctions").
158. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 248 (1944) (Jackson, J.,
dissenting).
159. But see Schauer, supra note 151, at 102-03.
160. See, e.g., H.C. 5100/94, Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. The
State of Israel, 53(4) P.D. 817, at para. 40 (Barak, P.) ("Our decision does not
negate the possibility that the 'necessity defense' will be available to GSS in-
vestigators... in the choice made by the Attorney-General in deciding
whether to prosecute.").
161. The case of Barzilai v. Government of Israel, reprinted in SELECTED
JUDGMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF ISRAEL, supra note 116, was part of a
unique chain of events-known as the "bus #300 affair"-that involved a
presidential clemency granted to eleven members of the General Security Ser-
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and governmental indemnification of state agents who are
found liable for damages to persons who were tortured.
162
Political and social ratification is also possible. A president
vice ("GSS") prior to trial, thus blocking any future possibility of criminal pro-
ceedings being brought against them.
On April 12, 1984, four residents of the Gaza Strip kidnapped an Israeli
bus. After a chase, the bus was stopped by the security forces. Several hours
later special units stormed the bus and freed the hostages. The Israeli media
reported at first that two of the four terrorists were killed during the opera-
tion. However, the reports were later amended to state that all four terrorists
were killed during the rescue operation. Several days passed until an Israeli
daily newspaper, Hadashot, ran a photograph showing two terrorists being led
away from the bus, obviously still alive. A special investigative committee, ap-
pointed by the Minister of Defense ("Zorea Committee"), found that two of the
terrorists had indeed been captured alive and later killed as a result of frac-
tures of their skulls inflicted by beatings. However, the Committee could not
conclusively decide who was responsible for the beatings. In May 1986, it was
publicly discovered that the two terrorists were executed by GSS members fol-
lowing a personal order given by the head of the GSS. It was also discovered
that GSS witnesses lied to the Zorea Committee, falsified evidence, and cor-
roborated their testimonies before the Committee. The GSS member on the
Zorea Committee played a crucial part in concealing the truth, acting as a
"Trojan horse" in the Committee. See Landau Report, supra note 2, at 151.
When the Attorney General insisted on carrying through the investigation
against the members of the GSS responsible for the killings, the government
decided to invoke a letter of resignation sent by the Attorney General to the
government before the affair exploded (for reasons which were unrelated to
the affair) and to replace him in the hope that a new Attorney General could
be more easily manipulated. The step was taken by the government despite
the Attorney General's clear indication that he wished to remain in office so as
to bring to conclusion the investigation of the affair. This was the first time in
Israeli history (and, indeed, the only one, so far) in which an Attorney General
was dismissed by the government. Interestingly enough, the former Attorney
General, Professor Yitzhak Zamir, was appointed some years later to the Is-
raeli Supreme Court. When even the newly appointed Attorney General ex-
pressed his determination to pursue the investigation and bring criminal
charges, a political deal emerged where eleven senior GSS officers, including
the head of the GSS, Avraham Shalom, who gave the order to kill, left the ser-
vice after receiving clemency by the President of the State of Israel, thus
blocking any possibility of future criminal charges being brought against
them. The office of the President, as well as the person occupying that office at
the time, President Herzog, came under a barrage of legal and public chal-
lenges. Among other things, in Barzilai v. Government of Israel, the petition-
ers argued that the president could not preventively pardon persons not yet
charged and not yet convicted of any offense. When the Supreme Court re-
jected the petition in a lengthy decision handed down in August 1986, it too
came under sharp criticism. For a legal critique of the judgment, see Mor-
dechai Kremnitzer, The Case of the Security Services Pardon, 12 IYUNEI
MISHPAT 595 (1987); Lahav, supra note 7, at 547-56. For more information on
the "bus #300 affair," see YECHIEL GuTMAN, A STORM IN THE G.S.S. 15-133
(1995).
162. Gross, supra note 94, at 1111-15.
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who personally authorizes the use of torture may be reelected
by a substantial majority in free and democratic elections
where the issue of torture constitutes a major part of the pre-
election public agenda. Alternatively, she may need to resign
her position or face impeachment proceedings. Yale Law Pro-
fessor Charles Black apparently put the matter to his constitu-
tional law class in the following terms: "[o]nce the torturer ex-
tracted the information required ... he should at once resign to
await trial, pardon, and/or a decoration, as the case might
be."163 Honorific awards can establish ex post ratification in ap-
propriate circumstances.1 64 Withholding a decoration may also
send a strong message of rejection and condemnation.165 Mi-
chael Walzer notes the remarkable "national dissociation" by
the British from the R.A.F. Bomber Command. The colorful di-
rector of the strategic "saturation bombing" of Germany from
February 1942 until the end of the war, Air Marshal Arthur
Harris-whose nickname, not at all coincidentally, was
"Bomber"-was not, unlike other commanders, rewarded with a
peerage. Even more tellingly, although bomber pilots suffered
heavy casualties, they are not recorded by name in Westmin-
ster Abbey, unlike all other pilots of Fighter Command who
died during the war. Walzer describes Harris as having "done
what his government thought necessary, but what he had done
was ugly, and there seems to have been a conscious decision not
to celebrate the exploits of Bomber Command or to honor its
leader.
, 166
163. A. Michael Froomkin, The Metaphor Is the Key: Cryptography, the
Clipper Chip, and the Constitution, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 709, 746 n.153 (1995)
(relating Professor Black's discussion of torture and morality).
164. One is reminded of La Rochefoucauld's maxim that "[elvil as well as
good has its heroes." 7 THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 72 (15th ed.
1989).
165. Withholding of decoration, as well as other forms of social ostracism,
is one specific example of informal sanctions that society may apply against
officials for acting in violation of a recognized rule. Other forms of informal
sanctions may involve the discreditation of the actor in the eyes of others, loss
of valued relationships with others, and putting in risk past accomplishments
of the rule violator. See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson, Should the Victims' Rights
Movement Have Influence over Criminal Law Formulation and Adjudication?,
33 MCGEORGE L. REV. 749, 749 (2002).
166. MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS 324 (3d ed. 2000). But see
ROBIN NEILLANDS, THE BOMBER WAR 401-04 (2001) (arguing that there is "no
truth in the popular allegations that Harris and Bomber Command were de-
nied any personal or official recognition"). See generally "The Bomber Harris
Trust" Home Page (providing links to numerous writings on the Bomber
Command), at http://www3.sympatico.ca/jimlynch (last modified Jan. 24,
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The proposed model emphasizes an ethic of responsibility
not only on the part of public officials, but also of the general
public. Officials will need to acknowledge openly the nature of
their actions and attempt to justify both their actions and their
undertaking of those actions. 67 This open acknowledgement
and engagement in public justificatory exercise is a critical
component in the moral and legal choice made by the acting of-
ficials. The public then must decide whether to ratify the rele-
vant extralegal actions. During the process of ratification, each
member of the public becomes morally and politically responsi-
ble for the decision. "[D]ecent men and women, hard-pressed in
war, must sometimes do terrible things," writes Walzer, "and
then they themselves have to look for some way to reaffirm the
values they have overthrown." 168 Yet it is not only the actors
who must attempt to find a way to reaffirm fundamental values
they have violated in times of great exigency; society must also
undertake a project of reaffirmation. Each member of society,
in whose name terrible things have been done, must become
morally responsible.'69 Such responsibility is assumed by, and
through, the process of ratification or rejection of the particular
terrible things that have been done "in our name."
IV. EX POST RATIFICATION
To acknowledge the possibility of extralegal action is not
the same thing as accepting willy-nilly limitless powers and au-
thority in the hands of state agents. In a democratic society,
where values such as constitutionalism, accountability, and in-
dividual rights are firmly entrenched and traditionally re-
spected, we can expect that the public would be circumspect
about governmental attempts to justify or excuse illegal actions
even if taken, arguably, to promote the general good. Moreover,
we can and should expect public officials to feel quite uneasy
about possible resort to extralegal measures, even when such
actions are deemed to be for the public's benefit. This feeling of
uneasiness would be even more pronounced in nations where
the "'constitution is old, observed for a long time, known, re-
2003).
167. MORTIMER R. KADISH & SANFORD H. KADISH, DISCRETION To
DISOBEY: A STUDY OF LAWFUL DEPARTURES FROM LEGAL RULES 5-12 (1973).
168. WALZER, supra note 166, at 325 (emphasis added).
169. But see Walzer, supra note 119, at 67 (suggesting that members of the
public may "have a right to avoid, if [they] possibly can, those [political or
other] positions in which [they] might be forced to do terrible things").
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spected, and cherished.""7 The knowledge that acting in a cer-
tain way means acting unlawfully is, in and of itself, going to
have a restraining effect on government agents, even while the
threat of catastrophe persists. This is especially true in the con-
text of torture. Here, the strong commitment to the rule of law
and the mood of veneration towards the Constitution and con-
stitutional norms 7' are strengthened by the fact that the pro-
hibition on torture "expresses one of the West's most powerful
taboos."' The absolute ban on torture has been internalized by
a great number of people around the world. This internaliza-
tion inherently makes it more difficult for conscientious offi-
cials to resort to torture, whatever the circumstances, 7' since
"torture simply is not done." In addition to self-policing
170. GUY HOWARD DODGE, BENJAMIN CONSTANT'S PHILOSOPHY OF
LIBERALISM: A STUDY IN POLITICS AND RELIGION 101 (1980) (quoting Benja-
min Constant). Constant recognized that in nations where the constitutional
experience is as described in the quoted excerpt, the constitution "can be sus-
pended for an instant, if a great emergency requires it." Id. He distinguishes
this case from the following: "if a constitution is new and not in practice nor
identified with the habit of a people, then every suspension, either partial or
temporary, is the end of that constitution." Id.; see also Gabriel L. Negretto &
Josd Antonio Aguilar Rivera, Liberalism and Emergency Powers in Latin
America: Reflections on Carl Schmitt and the Theory of Constitutional Dicta-
torship, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 1797, 1800-03 (2000) (discussing Constant's the-
ory of "self-defeating dictatorships").
171. See Sanford Levinson, "Veneration" and Constitutional Change: James
Madison Confronts the Possibility of Constitutional Amendment, 21 TEX. TECH
L. REV. 2443, 2451-52 (1990); see also Max Lerner, Constitution and Court as
Symbols, 46 YALE L.J. 1290, 1294-95 (1937); Sanford Levinson, "The Constitu-
tion" in American Civil Religion, 1979 SUP. CT. REV. 123, 123.
172. Is Torture Ever Justified?, supra note 128, at 9.
173. The internalization thesis may be challenged from two opposing direc-
tions. First, it may be argued that even if conscientious officials may find it
hard to resort to torture, torturers are not of high moral character. Only mor-
ally deficient individuals are capable, and willing, to engage in the morally
filthy job of "cleaning the sewer pipes." See Landau Report, supra note 2, at
183 (quoting a GSS witness as saying "[uit is convenient for the citizen to sit on
the clean green grass in front of his house, while beneath him the refuse is
washed away in the sewerage pipes"). The more such morally deficient indi-
viduals engage in acts of torture, the more morally deficient they become. See
Daniel Statman, The Absoluteness of the Prohibition Against Torture, 4 MISH-
PAT U'MIMSHAL 161, 176-77 (1997). Second, it has been suggested that many
torturers are not "vicious, insane, malicious, disconnected interpersonally, or
coerced by a totalitarian state" to engage in acts of torture, but rather they are
unaware of the criminal nature of their actions and believe these to be not
only legal, but also morally and legally required. See MARK OSIEL, MASS
ATROCITY, ORDINARY EVIL, AND HANNAH ARENDT: CRIMINAL CONSCIOUSNESS
IN ARGENTINA'S DIRTY WAR 154 (2002); Mark Osiel, The Mental State of
Torturers: Argentina's Dirty War, in TORTURE, supra note 12 (manuscript on
file with author).
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internalization, the fact that the ban on torture is among the
most powerful taboos and torture is the subject of special moral
and legal condemnation means that an official who elects to de-
viate from this widely accepted and entrenched norm is likely
to suffer significant reputational damage. This adds yet an-
other layer to the ban's effectiveness. '74
My proposal calls for maintaining an absolute legal ban on
torture while, at the same time, recognizing the possibility (but
not certainty) of state agents acting extralegally-employing
preventive interrogational torture in catastrophic cases-and
seeking ex post ratification of their conduct.' The element of ex
post ratification is critical to my project. This part outlines
some of the benefits of appeal to a subsequent ratification. The
next part discusses Dershowitz's torture warrant proposal, and
analyzes the advantages of the ex post ratification process over
ex ante judicial approval of interrogational torture.
The need to give reasons ex post, i.e., the need to publicly
justify or excuse (not merely explain) one's actions after the
fact, emphasizes accountability of government agents. 76 The
174. See Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of
Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 355-65 (1997).
175. I would argue that the possibility of acting extralegally in catastrophic
cases facilitates, in and of itself, an absolute prohibition on torture. Consider
the dilemma judges face when asked to take an expansive view of constitu-
tional rights, recognizing that such broad constructions may come back to
haunt the nation during catastrophes, which may necessitate limitations on
those rights. The prospect of official disobedience shifts the pressure away
from the courts and places much of the burden on the shoulders of government
and its agents. If the situation is serious enough, there remains "the possibil-
ity of government officials acting extralegally to protect the nation and its citi-
zens." Gross, supra note 94, at 1122. The very possibility of such action "re-
duces the pressures for incorporating built-in exceptions to protected rights,"
in general, and limiting the scope of the ban on torture, in particular. Id.;
Christopher L. Eisgruber, The Most Competent Branches: A Response to Pro-
fessor Paulsen, 83 GEO. L.J. 347, 360-62 (1994).
176. Slavoj Zizek argues that transparency may not be desirable in this
context, suggesting that
we should.., paradoxically stick to the apparent "hypocrisy": OK, we
can well imagine that in a specific situation, confronted with the pro-
verbial "prisoner who knows" and whose words can save thousands,
we would resort to torture--even (or, rather, precisely) in such a case,
however, it is absolutely crucial that we do not elevate this desperate
choice into a universal principle; following the unavoidable brutal ur-
gency of the moment, we should simply do it. Only in this way.., do
we retain the sense of guilt, the awareness of the inadmissibility of
what we have done.
SLAVOJ ZIZEK, WELCOME TO THE DESERT OF THE REAL! FIvE ESSAYS ON
SEPTEMBER 11 AND RELATED DATES 103 (2002), quoted in Levinson, supra
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model of official disobedience puts the burden squarely on the
shoulders of state agents who must act, sometimes extralegally,
without the benefit of legal preapproval of their actions by the
courts or the legislature. 177 Public officials have no one to hide
behind. They must put themselves on the front line and act at
their own peril.'78 If they believe that the stakes are high
enough to merit an extralegal action, they may take such action
and hope to be able to convince the public to see things their
way. As suggested above, the threshold of illegality provides an
intrinsic limit against a rush to employ unnecessary measures.
The need to give reasons for the extralegal conduct may also
limit the government's choice of measures ex ante, adding an-
other layer of restraint on governmental action.'79 Open ac-
knowledgment of extralegal measures taken by government
agents will contribute to reasoned discourse and dialogue be-
tween the government and its domestic constituency, between
the government and other governments, and between the gov-
ernment and nongovernmental or international organizations.
The benefits of the ex post justificatory exercise are not con-
fined to the domestic sphere; it has international implications,
both political and legal.
180
By separating the issues of action (i.e., preventive interro-
gational torture) and public ratification, and by ordering them
so that ratification follows, rather than precedes, action, the
proposed model adds a significant element of uncertainty to the
decision-making calculus of state agents. This "prudent obfus-
cation" 8' raises both the individual and national costs of pursu-
note 10, at 2042. However, Zizek makes this argument against Dershowitz's
apparent attempt to legalize the use of torture through the mechanism of the
torture warrant. Id. As I will argue below, the official disobedience model
avoids this pitfall of Dershowitz's proposal. See infra Part V.
177. See, e.g., Amnon Reichman, "When We Sit to Judge We Are Being
Judged": The Israeli GSS Case, Ex Parte Pinochet and Domestic I Global De-
liberation, 9 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 41, 67-68 (2001).
178. See, e.g., Dripps, supra note 109, at 721 n.89.
179. See Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REV. 633, 656-57
(1995); see also Joseph M. Bessette & Jeffrey Tulis, The Constitution, Politics,
and the Presidency, in THE PRESIDENCY IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 3, 10
(Joseph M. Bessette & Jeffrey Tulis eds., 1981) (arguing that the need for pub-
lic justification may influence the choice of political acts).
180. The reasons put forward by a state to justify its actions may be subject
to scrutiny not only by other governments and nongovernmental organiza-
tions, but also by judicial and quasi-judicial bodies such as the European
Court of Human Rights, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, and the
United Nations Human Rights Commission.
181. Dan M. Kahan, Ignorance of Law Is an Excuse-But Only for the Vir-
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ing an extralegal course of action and, at the same time, rein-
forces the general ban on torture.
18 2
With the need to obtain ex post ratification from the public,
the official who decides to use torture undertakes a significant
risk because of the uncertain prospects for subsequent ratifica-
tion. The public may, for example, disagree after the fact with
the acting official's assessment of the situation and the need to
act extralegally. Ratification would be sought ex post, when
more information about the particular case at hand may be
available to the public, and possibly after the particular danger
(which the use of preventive interrogational torture sought to
avert) has been eliminated.183 Under such circumstances, it is
possible that calm and rationality, rather than heightened
emotions, would govern public discourse, emphasizing further
the risk for the official in acting first and seeking approval sec-
ond. The public may also determine that the extralegal actions
violated values and principles that are too important to be en-
croached upon, as a matter of principle or in the circumstances
of the particular case. The greater the moral and legal interests
and values infringed upon, the less certain the actor can be of
securing ratification.
Uncertainty is also important because it reduces the poten-
tial risk of under-deterrence that is involved in the possibility
of ex post ratification. Under-deterrence may be a significant
tuous, 96 MICH. L. REV. 127, 139-41 (1997) (discussing "prudent obfuscation"
as a means to respond to the penal law's persistent incompleteness). Kahan
discusses the use of vague terms in criminal laws, giving courts "the flexibility
to adapt the law to innovative forms of crime ex post." Id. at 139.
182. Richard Posner underestimates the value of uncertainty in this con-
text. See Posner, supra note 34 (manuscript at 8) (supporting a position where
the customary legal prohibitions on torture are left intact, "but with the un-
derstanding that of course they will not be enforced in extreme circumstances"
(emphases added)). For reasons explained below, I reject both the desirability
of such an a priori understanding and its self-evident characterization. For
another proposal designed to increase the costs of engaging in interrogational
torture, see Levinson, supra note 10, at 2049, suggesting the possibility of pay-
ing "just compensation" to anyone against whom a torture warrant was issued.
Levinson argues that "the ex ante assignment of such a price, especially if it is
substantial and paid to everyone who is tortured, might itself serve to limit the
incidence of torture." Id. at 2050.
183. One potential problem with this appeal to hindsight is that if the offi-
cial who tortures is successful, the catastrophic harm will be averted. How-
ever, the occurrence of harm plays a significant role in shaping the public per-
ception about the permissibility of using extraordinary measures against
"terrorists." Thus, if the harm is prevented, the assessment of the legitimacy of
acting extralegally is likely to be more heavily weighted against the acting of-
ficial. I thank Barry Feld for drawing my attention to this problem.
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concern if interrogators have good reason to believe that ratifi-
cation will be forthcoming in future cases where they employ
preventive interrogational torture.8 This may result, for ex-
ample, from conditions of low "acoustic separation."'8' According
to Meir Dan-Cohen, law contains two separate sets of norma-
tive messages that are directed at the general public ("conduct
rules") and officials who make decisions with respect to actions
taken by members of the public ("decision rules").'88 Although a
complete "acoustic" separation between these two sets of mes-
sages is unrealistic, some degree of separation occurs in the
real world. Thus, some messages are more likely to register
with either the general public or official decision makers. 7 A
low level of acoustic separation may result from the sophisti-
cated legal mechanisms that are available to interrogators (e.g.,
access to legal staff of the relevant security service), the possi-
bility of advance contemplation of different modes of conduct in
future catastrophic bomb cases (even without the ability to an-
ticipate in advance all possible features of such cases), and the
possible professional and personal links between the interroga-
tors and the service in which they work and other state au-
thorities (e.g., other law enforcement agencies).'88 These condi-
tions of low acoustic separation increase the likelihood that
officials will be familiar with both sets of normative messages,
i.e., both with the particular conduct and decision rules, and
will be able to act strategically based on their awareness of the
184. Parry & White, supra note 29, at 764-65; see also Levinson, supra
note 10, at 2045-48 (suggesting that the norm against torture is likely to be
under-enforced).
185. Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic
Separation in Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625 (1984). For further discus-
sion of the concept of acoustic separation in the context of interrogational tor-
ture, see Miriam Gur-Arye, Can the War Against Terror Justify the Use of
Force in Interrogations? Reflections in Light of the Israeli Experience, in
TORTURE, supra note 12 (manuscript on file with author); Dudi Zecharia, On
Torture Chambers and Acoustic Walls, 10 POLITIKA 61 (2003). Under-
deterrence may also be linked to the establishment of precedents of ex post
ratification.
186. Dan-Cohen, supra note 185, at 630-34. One example of such separa-
tion addresses the concern about setting unrealistic standards. Thus, Dan-
Cohen suggests that the criminal defense of duress should not be understood
as constituting a conduct rule directed at the general public, but rather as a
decision rule that allows decision makers to express compassion in imposing
punishment. Id. at 633-34.
187. Id. at 634.
188. Id. at 636-41.
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two sets of messages. Significantly, such conditions of low
acoustic separation create substantial risks of undesirable be-
havioral side effects on the part of officials, e.g., by allowing de-
cision rules-which recognize the possibility that agents who
resort to preventive interrogational torture in catastrophic
cases may be let off the hook-to affect conduct in specific cases
(i.e., state agents resorting to torture, despite the existence of
an absolute ban, knowing, or at least having good reason to be-
lieve, that they will enjoy immunity against criminal charges
and civil claims).190
However, the element of uncertainty, which is so critical to
the official disobedience model, has similar effects to what Dan-
Cohen calls "strategies of selective transmission."' 9 Whereas
the means of selective transmission facilitate the channeling of
different sets of norms to different constituencies (i.e., the gen-
eral public and the authorities), the selectivity in our context
draws a clear separating divide between conduct and decision
rules, thus minimizing the risks of behavioral side effects. A
certain role reversal between public officials and the general
public takes place under the official disobedience model: con-
duct rules related to torture will especially target public offi-
cials, whereas decision rules would mostly (but not exclu-
sively) be directed at the general public, which assumes the
mantle of ex post decision maker. In this context, the relevant
conduct rules are crystal clear: torture is prohibited absolutely,
whatever the circumstances. At the same time, the more uncer-
tain the substance and the operation of the decision rules are,
and the greater the personal risk involved in wrongly interpret-
ing either of those is, the greater the incentive for individual
actors to conform their action to the conduct rules that prohibit
torture in all cases.
Moreover, even if we accept that there exists a good chance
that ex post ratification will be forthcoming, there are still sig-
nificant costs to acting extralegally. Even if the public ratifies
the decision to use preventive interrogational torture in a spe-
cific case, there may be personal implications for the officials
189. Id. at 640-41.
190. Id. at 631-32.
191. Id. at 634-36.
192. Note, for example, the Convention Against Torture defines torture as
involving severe pain or suffering that is "inflicted by or at the instigation of or
with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in
an official capacity." Convention Against Torture, supra note 9, art. 1.
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involved in the decision to apply torture. These implications
emanate, for example, from the anxiety that ratification will, in
fact, not follow or because ratification may not be comprehen-
sive and fully corrective. Subsequent ratification may, for ex-
ample, shield the actor against criminal charges, but not bar
victims of torture from obtaining compensation in civil proceed-
ings. Similarly, when ratification assumes the guise of an ex-
ecutive pardon or clemency, it eliminates the criminal penalty
that was imposed on the individual actor, but it removes nei-
ther the ordeal of criminal prosecution nor the condemnation
associated with criminal conviction.
19 3
When we broaden our view to incorporate not only domes-
tic, but also international legal rules and norms, the costs of
acting extralegally are increased, adding yet another disincen-
tive to engage in such conduct. Thus, even if the use of torture
in any given case is domestically excused ex post, it may be sub-
ject to a different judgment on the international plane. This
may have significant consequences both for the individual actor
(i.e., the interrogator) and her government. First, torturers may
be subject to criminal and civil proceedings in jurisdictions
other than their own, and may also be subject to international
criminal prosecution. 94 Second, the ban on torture is non-
derogable under the major international human rights conven-
tions.'95 As such, no argument of public emergency can justify
or excuse a deviation from the prohibition. State agents who
engage in acts of preventive interrogational torture implicate
their government in violation of the nation's international obli-
gations and expose it to a range of possible remedies under the
relevant international legal instruments. 96
193. See, e.g., Leon Sheleff, On Criminal Homicide and Legal Self Defense,
6 PLILIM 89, 111-12 (1997); see also Kamisar, supra note 89, at 1143-44 (reli-
ance on mitigation of sentence fails to mitigate the "ordeal of a criminal prose-
cution or the stigma of a conviction").
194. See, e.g., Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.183/9 (1998), Art. 7(1)(f) (defining torture as a crime against human-
ity); Convention Against Torture, supra note 9, arts. 4-8; Filartiga v. Pena-
Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980); Ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No. 3), [2000] 1
A.C. 147 (House of Lords); Ex parte Pinochet Ugarte, [2000] 1 A.C. 61 (House
of Lords); Amnesty Int'l, Universal Jurisdiction: The Duty of States to Enact
and Enforce Legislation (2001) (finding that eighty states have enacted legis-
lation that permits the exercise of universal jurisdiction over torture), avail-
able at http:llweb.amnesty.org/web/web.nsf/pages/legal-memorandum.
195. See supra note 9.
196. See American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 9, arts. 5(2),
27(2); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 9, arts.
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Thus, the official disobedience model imposes a significant
burden on public officials. They must act in the face of great
uncertainty. At the same time the model does not completely
bar the possibility that interrogational torture will be used by
officials and later ratified by the public. It simply makes it ex-
tremely costly to resort to such drastic measures, limiting their
use to exceptional exigencies. As Sanford Kadish notes, 'Would
not the burden on the official be so great that it would require
circumstances of a perfectly extraordinary character to induce
the individual to take the risk of acting? The answer is of
course yes, that's the point."'97
V. UNWARRANTED TORTURE WARRANTS
Counterterrorism measures must satisfy two general pre-
cepts. They should provide government with a certain degree of
flexibility necessary to respond successfully to unanticipated
crises and exigencies.198 At the same time, restrictions and limi-
tations must exist to prevent government from amassing
unlimited powers.' 99
Professor Dershowitz seems to support a conditional ban
200
on torture as a response to the need-for-flexibility concern.
4, 7; European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms, supra note 9, arts. 3, 15; see also Winston P. Nagan & Lucie
Atkins, The International Law of Torture: From Universal Proscription to Ef-
fective Application and Enforcement, 14 HARV. HUM. RTs. J. 87 (2001).
197. Kadish, supra note 27, at 355.
198. As Alexander Hamilton argued in support of limitless government
powers essential to the common defense:
[It is impossible to foresee or define the extent and variety of na-
tional exigencies, and the correspondent extent and variety of the
means which may be necessary to satisfy them. The circumstances
that endanger the safety of nations are infinite, and for this reason no
constitutional shackles can wisely be imposed on the power to which
the care of it is committed.
THE FEDERALIST No. 23, at 153 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) (emphasis omitted).
199. Gross, supra note 94, at 1030.
200. I say 'seems to support" because at least in one instance Dershowitz
claims that his normative preference would be "for the courts to declare all
forms of torture unconstitutional." Alan M. Dershowitz, Reply: Torture With-
out Visibility and Accountability Is Worse Than with It, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
326, 326 (2003). Dershowitz elsewhere argues, however, that the Constitution
does not bar the use of preventive interrogational torture. DERSHOWITZ, supra
note 18, at 135-36; cf Kreimer, supra note 17, at 282, 283-317. Since my focus
is on the normative questions of whether torture should ever be legally or
morally permissible in a way that is not jurisdiction specific, I will not join
that important debate here.
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However, he does not discount the dangers of untrammeled
governmental discretion. His solution comes in the form ofjudi-
cial "torture warrants."20 '
The real choice with respect to interrogational torture,
Dershowitz tells us, is between two alternatives. Assuming that
torture should be, and would be, used in the catastrophic case,
the question becomes: Is it worse to make torture part of the le-
gal system, or to have it done "off the books and below the ra-
dar screen"?'2 Dershowitz argues that his "torture warrant"
proposal ensures that, to the extent it is going to be used, tor-
ture would be "done openly, pursuant to a previously estab-
lished legal procedure."23 The only alternative, which Dershow-
itz rejects, entails secret use of torture in violation of existing
law.20 4 Yet, he misses the possibility, which the official disobe-
dience model presents, of using torture "off the books" while not
eschewing transparency and accountability. Indeed, as Parts
III and IV above demonstrate, "off the books" need not mean
"below the radar screen." In fact, as I argue below, if we follow
Dershowitz's own criteria for a working model in this context,
i.e., one that "reduce[s] the use of torture to the smallest
amount and degree possible, while creating public accountabil-
ity for its rare use ,2 °5 the official disobedience model is superior
to torture warrants.
The official disobedience model and Dershowitz's torture
warrants proposal start from opposite ends with respect to the
question whether torture should ever be legally permissible.
Under the former model the answer is negative, whereas under
the latter it is affirmative. Yet, both models recognize the need
to account for catastrophic cases, and accept the argument that,
under certain extreme exigencies, torture may be morally de-
fensible. The official disobedience model concedes that public
officials may use preventive interrogational torture under such
extreme circumstances, but identifies such actions as extrale-
gal. In contrast, Dershowitz seeks to transform torture into
part of the legal system by way of advance torture warrants is-
sued by judges. Accordingly, authorities may utilize torture
lawfully, provided that they obtain advance judicial torture
warrants. Ex post ratification by society is thus substituted for
201. DERSHOWITZ, supra note 18, at 141, 158-63.
202. Id. at 151-52, 156.
203. Id. at 151.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 141.
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ex ante judicial approval.
However, the torture warrant proposal is problematic on
its own terms. Furthermore, the official disobedience model
does a better job in reducing the use of torture while creating
public accountability for its use.
A. WARRANTS AND CATASTROPHIC CASES
The Fourth Amendment requires the government to secure
a judicial warrant based on probable cause prior to conducting
searches and seizures.2 °6 However, the warrant requirement
has been subject to several important exceptions. These excep-
tions usually apply when obtaining a warrant is impracticable
under specific circumstances.0 7 In such special cases, war-
rantless searches would still be deemed constitutional. Yet, by
its own terms, Dershowitz's torture warrant may only be issued
in truly catastrophic cases, such as the paradigmatic ticking
bomb case where a grave terrorist attack is imminent. In other
words, Dershowitz's warrant requirement is only applicable in
extreme special cases! It makes little sense for a legal system to
regard judicial warrants as unnecessary in special circum-
stances, even when those circumstances do not amount to an
extreme case, yet require, even in such exceptional exigencies
(in fact, precisely in those circumstances), a warrant for pre-
ventive interrogational torture. Even if a general "national se-S 208
curity" exception is not recognized, catastrophic cases, such
as the ticking bomb case, are likely to fall into the "exigent cir-
cumstances" exception to the warrant and probable cause re-
quirements of the Fourth Amendment.209 Courts should not
206. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357
(1967) (imposing a presumptive warrant requirement for searches and sei-
zures under the Fourth Amendment); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10,
14-15 (1948) (requiring a warrant for search and seizure under the Fourth
Amendment, unless a preexisting exception applies).
207. Such exceptions include the following: investigatory detentions, war-
rantless arrests, searches incident to a valid arrest, seizure of items in plain
view, exigent circumstances, vehicle searches, container searches, inventory
searches, border searches, searches at sea, administrative searches, and
searches in which the special needs of law enforcement make the probable
cause and warrant requirements impracticable. See, e.g., Theodore P. Metzler
et al., Investigation and Police Practices, Warrantless Searches and Seizures,
89 GEO. L.J. 1084, 1084 (2001).
208. See generally David S. Eggert, Note, Executive Order 12,333: An As-
sessment of the Validity of Warrantless National Security Searches, 1983 DUKE
L.J. 611, 620-34.
209. See, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 474-75 (1971) ("It
[Vol 88:14811536
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treat torture warrants any differently than other "exigent cir-
cumstances." If anything, the circumstances surrounding the
catastrophic case would present a strong case against the need
for judicial warrant. One possible explanation for treating tor-
ture warrants differently looks at the nature of the activity for
which a warrant is required. Torture, it may be argued, is sig-
nificantly worse than a search with respect to the nature of the
individual interests that are compromised and the degree of
harm inflicted on such interests. Use of torture must, therefore,
be subject to stricter rules. But against the weightier individual
interests, the government is likely to present the most compel-
ling competing interest embodied by the catastrophic case. The
persuasiveness of this argument notwithstanding, it seems
quite clear that the same forces that carved out exceptions to
the Fourth Amendment's warrant and probable cause require-
ments would have a similar effect in the context of torture war-
rants.
William Stuntz suggests that
warrant requirements tend to oscillate between two bad poles. Water
down the warrant process to make it affordable, and the process be-
comes pointless; magistrates turn into rubber stamps and the virtue
of asking their permission disappears. Make the process a serious
screen, and it becomes expensive enough that the police hardly ever
use it; the warrant functions as a de facto prohibition.21 °
Should torture warrants become part of the interrogation
procedure of suspected terrorists, courts are likely to turn into
rubber stamps, authorizing governmental torture.21 If, on the
other hand, torture warrants are to provide a "serious screen,"
they will become prohibitive in the context of the catastrophic
case.212 In that case we would find ourselves returning to a de
facto absolute prohibition on torture without having resolved
the challenge of the catastrophic case while, at the same time,
not availing the legal system of the benefits of an outright abso-
lute ban on torture (such as the symbolic and educational value
of such a sanction).
is accepted . . .that a search or seizure carried out on a suspect's premises
without a warrant is per se unreasonable, unless the police can show that it
falls within one of a carefully defined set of exceptions based on the presence
of 'exigent circumstances."'); Creighton v. Anderson, 922 F.2d 443 (8th Cir.
1990); Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
210. Stuntz, supra note 110, at 2183.
211. See infra notes 216-19 and accompanying text.
212. See infra notes 222-24 and accompanying text.
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B. COURTS AND TORTURE
It has been argued that the need to come before neutral
judges to secure a warrant prior to applying torture in catas-
trophic cases would add another procedural hoop through
which interrogators must jump before they are able to use tor-
ture. This additional hurdle may reduce the number of interro-
gations in which torture is applied by presenting another criti-
cal juncture for the assessment and evaluation of the necessity
of interrogational torture by independent judges who are re-
moved from the needs of the particular interrogation. 213 Courts
may decide, even if in rare cases, not to grant the request to use
interrogational torture. Moreover, law enforcement officials,
and the lawyers representing them, may screen the cases
where a judicial torture warrant is requested to avoid the em-
barrassment of coming to court with a weak case." 4 Finally,
when a suspect is made aware that she may be legally tortured,
she may decide to "voluntarily" divulge the critical information,
thus preempting the need to actually use interrogational tor-
ture.215
However, each of these claims is problematic. It is widely
recognized that judges assume a highly deferential attitude
when called upon to review governmental actions and decisions
in times of grave national crises.216 Indeed, Dershowitz himself
213. DERSHOWITZ, supra note 18, at 158 ("I believe, though I certainly can-
not prove, that a formal requirement of a judicial warrant as a prerequisite to
nonlethal torture would decrease the amount of physical violence directed
against suspects.").
214. See, e.g., Yoav Dotan, Judicial Rhetoric, Government Lawyers, and
Human Rights: The Case of the Israeli High Court of Justice During the Inti-
fada, 33 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 319, 332-34 (1999) (finding that between 1986 and
1995, whereas Palestinian petitioners formally won just 4.5% of cases coming
before the Israeli Supreme Court sitting as High Court of Justice, if we con-
sider cases in which the petitioners achieved their goals in full because the
government backed off from its original position during the litigation, or dur-
ing out-of-court settlements, the overall rate of petitioners' success rises to
62.3%). See generally William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal
Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 570-71 (2001); Ronald Wright & Marc Miller,
The Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, 55 STAN. L. REV. 29, 48-58 (2002).
215. DERSHOWITZ, supra note 18, at 159; cf. Kremnitzer, supra note 39, at
251; John T. Parry, supra note 112, at 247-48 ("When torture is legal in the
sense of being an official policy, the victims' suffering and pain become irrele-
vant to the law and they become further isolated at the moment they are most
in need of the law's protections.").
216. See Gross, supra note 94, at 1034-35 and sources cited therein; see
also John C. Yoo, Judicial Review and the War on Terrorism, 72 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 427 (2003) (noting with approval the fact that courts are developing
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expressed serious misgivings about the courts' ability to protect
individual rights and liberties in times of exigency. The con-
text in which courts are to consider issuing torture warrants
exacerbates this problem. Ex parte proceedings will not likely
provide a meaningful hurdle to torturing suspects if the gov-
ernment's representative can plausibly inform the judge (or
judges) that unless she issues, without delay, 18 a warrant to
torture a suspected terrorist, vital information will not be ob-
tained by the authorities, with the highly probable outcome
that a significant terrorist attack will not be averted.21 9 Operat-
ing under such conditions of uncertainty, with the stakes being
so high and the time for informed decision so short, courts will
opt to err on the side of caution and defer to the judgment of
the government. In fact, even if courts may, on rare occasions,
decline to issue a warrant authorizing officials to torture a sus-
pect,220 such exceptional decisions would, paradoxically, "en-
able" the courts to grant government its wishes in the vast
deferential judicial review in contexts such as the detention of enemy combat-
ants and FISA surveillance).
217. Alan M. Dershowitz, The Role of Law During Times of Crisis: Would
Liberty Be Suspended?, in CIVIL DISORDER AND VIOLENCE 133 (Harry M. Clor
ed., 1972) (focusing on the failure of courts to vindicate rights in times of cri-
sis).
218. See Gross, supra note 94, at 1038-39 (arguing that acute crises tend to
lead to an increased reliance on cognitive heuristics as a means of countering
the lack of sufficient time to properly evaluate the situation).
219. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 34, at 8 (arguing that Dershowitz "exag-
gerates the significance of the warrant as a check on executive discretion,"
since it "is issued in an ex parte proceeding, and usually the officer seeking the
warrant has a choice of judges or magistrates from whom to seek it"). Amnon
Reichman explains the likely cost-benefit calculus this way:
If the Attorney General or the court effectively bar the GSS from ap-
plying force in a given case and a bomb does indeed explode, the (un-
elected) judicial and quasi-judicial institutions will bear the blame. It
is therefore easy to see how, in case of doubt, the scales of risk might
lead these institutions to err on the side of permitting the use of force
for the sake of security.
Reichman, supra note 177, at 67; see also Kreimer, supra note 17, at 320-21.
220. Since the 1987 publication of the Landau Report, supra note 2, the
Supreme Court of Israel has heard a large number of petitions brought before
it by detained Palestinians who complained that they had been tortured while
in GSS custody. Until the 1999 decision in Public Committee Against Torture
in Israel v. The State of Israel, H.C. 5100/94, 53(4) P.D. 817, the Court rejected
the majority of the petitions, effectively allowing the GSS, for the most part, to
continue to employ interrogational torture. In isolated cases, the High Court
issued orders to show cause and interim orders temporarily prohibiting the
GSS from using all or some of the methods.
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majority of cases.221
Dershowitz acknowledges that "in a democracy it is always
preferable to decide controversial issues in advance, rather
than in the heat of battle."222 However, the requirement of judi-
cial torture warrants runs against this logic. Courts will be
asked to issue such warrants very much "in the heat of battle,"
with the proverbial bomb ticking ominously in the back-
ground. Discussion about controversial issues "in advance"
may certainly be desirable. Yet, the issue of preventive interro-
gational torture belies almost any ex ante decision, other than
highly general and abstract ones. At the same time, catastro-
phic cases call for more contextualized, case-specific, and par-
ticularistic determinations. However, decisions ex post may still
alleviate the concerns that are involved in deciding matters "in
the heat of battle. 224
Forcing the courts to get involved in the gruesome business
of torture through the mechanism of torture warrants comes
with a heavy price to the integrity of the judicial branch. Issu-
ing torture warrants will make judges "allied with bad acts," or,
at the very least, appear to be so allied. 25 This will have signifi-
221. See, e.g., Ronen Shamir, "Landmark Cases" and the Reproduction of
Legitimacy: The Case of Israel's High Court of Justice, 24 LAW & SOC'Y REV.
781, 781 (1990) (arguing that decisions that counter some governmental prac-
tices allow courts to confer legitimacy on other governmental policies).
222. DERSHOWITZ, supra note 18, at 162.
223. See, e.g., William F. Schulz, The Torturer's Apprentice, THE NATION,
Apr. 25, 2002 (book review) (suggesting that "if the ticking bomb scenario is a
fantasy, the Dershowitzian addition of a 'torture warrant' makes it into a chi-
mera"), available at http://www.thenation.com/doc.mhtml?i=20020513&c=
1&s=schulz.
224. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER N. MAY, IN THE NAME OF WAR: JUDICIAL
REVIEW AND THE WAR POWERS SINCE 1918, at 268 (1989) (suggesting that, in
light of judicial practice of abdicating review of executive activities during an
emergency, "courts should steer a middle course and defer review until the
emergency has abated"); WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE 222
(1998) ("If, in fact, courts are more prone to uphold wartime claims of civil lib-
erties after the war is over, may it not actually be desirable to avoid decision
on such claims during the war?"); CLINTON ROSSITER & RICHARD P.
LONGAKER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF 38 (ex-
panded ed. 1976) (referring to Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866), "It
is one thing for a Court to lecture a President when the emergency has passed,
quite another to stand up in the middle of the battle and inform him that he is
behaving unconstitutionally.").
225. Robert M. Bloom, Judicial Integrity: A Call for Its Re-emergence in the
Adjudication of Criminal Cases, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 462, 464
(1993); Chanterelle Sung, Torturing the Ticking Bomb Terrorist: An Analysis
of Judicially Sanctioned Torture in the Context of Terrorism, 23 B.C. THIRD
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cant costs in the context of the public perception of the judicial
system.22' To the extent that judges would become mere rubber
stamps, "adjunct law enforcement officer[s] ,227 issuing torture
warrants in all, or nearly all, incidents where such warrants
are sought, questions about the "neutral and detached" role of
judges may cast further doubts as to whether a valid judicial
authorization could be given to an otherwise unconstitutionalinterogaiona " " 228
interrogational torture. On the other hand, the official dis-
obedience model offers a better prospect for keeping the courts,
at least initially, away from the sewerage pipes of torture. 29
Finally, screening by law enforcement agents and their
lawyers may also fail to provide a significant check against
government use of torture. Richard Posner notes that "[t]he re-
quirement of a warrant would no doubt make the officers seek-
ing them a little more careful, but perhaps not much more
truthful or candid."2 3' Realizing that courts are likely to assume
a highly deferential attitude when asked to issue torture war-
rants, and seeking to have such warrants as a shield against
potential claims and charges,2 ' officials will have positive in-
WORLD L.J. 193, 207-09 (2003) (book review).
226. It is worth noting that the effects on public perception, while focusing
primarily on domestic constituencies-such as the general public and other
branches of government-also have an important transnational component.
National courts form part of a wider, global, epistemic community of courts.
See, e.g., Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Global Community of Courts, 44 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 191, 192-94 (2003).
227. Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319, 327 (1979).
228. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984); Aguilar v. Texas,
378 U.S. 108, 111 (1964) ("[Tlhe court must still insist that the magistrate per-
form his 'neutral and detached' function and not serve merely as a rubber
stamp for the police.").
229. See supra note 175; cf. Levinson, supra note 10, at 2048-49 (arguing
that one advantage of the torture warrant proposal is to be found precisely in
the fact that it makes the judges complicit in the act of torture).
230. Posner, supra note 34, at 8; see also Myron W. Orfield, Jr., Deterrence,
Perjury, and the Heater Factor: An Exclusionary Rule in the Chicago Criminal
Courts, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 75, 82-83 (1992) (arguing that police officers
commit perjury in almost twenty percent of Fourth Amendment cases);
Stephen A. Saltzburg, The Supreme Court, Criminal Procedure and Judicial
Integrity, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 133, 134, 149-51 (2003) (arguing that the Su-
preme Court is hinting to law enforcement officials that they can escape the
Fourth Amendment's restrictions if they offer "phony explanations for ac-
tions"). Together with its findings about the use of coercive methods by GSS
investigators in interrogating terrorist suspects, the Landau Commission
found an established pattern of GSS officers lying to the courts when the vol-
untary nature of confessions obtained by such methods had been challenged.
Landau Report, supra note 2, at 148-49.
231. Thus, for example, a search warrant would virtually guarantee quali-
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centives to take an increasing number of cases to the courts. In
fact, this would be true even for borderline cases since the risk
of not obtaining a warrant is minimal, whereas the benefits for
the officials are significant if a warrant is issued.
C. LEGALIZATION AND LEGITIMIZATION OF TORTURE
At the end of its celebrated decision on GSS investiga-
tions,232 the Israeli Supreme Court, sitting as High Court of
Justice, suggested that "[w]hether it is appropriate for Israel,
in light of its security difficulties, to sanction physical means is
an issue that must be decided by the legislative branch, which
represents the people. 33 Attempts to pass legislation that
would, in fact, legalize the use of what is known euphemisti-
cally as "physical pressure" in interrogations in exceptional
cases have since all failed.134 The arguments against such le-
galization of torture are overwhelming. Thus, for example,
apart from significant public relations costs, legislative accom-
modation is likely to induce officials to use their draconian in-
terrogation powers, if only because "they are there."235 And by
the mere incorporation of a set of extraordinary governmental
powers into the legal system, a weakening of that legal sys-
tem's resolve against using torture will have already taken
place.236
fled immunity to officers carrying out the warrant, even if the warrant should
not have been issued in the first place, unless "no reasonably competent officer
would have concluded" that the information that served as the basis for the
warrant application, established probable cause. See, e.g., Malley v. Briggs,
475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986).
232. H.C. 5100/94 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. The State of
Israel, 53(4) P.D. 817.
233. Id. para. 39.
234. See, e.g., Dan Izenberg, Shin Bet Bill Moves Forward, JERUSALEM
POST, Jan. 30, 2002, at 5. On March 14, 2000, Prime Minister Ehud Barak an-
nounced publicly his support for legislation that would allow the use of physi-
cal force in GSS interrogations in "ticking bomb" cases. See Nina Gilbert, Ba-
rak Favors GSS 'Pressure Tactics', JERUSALEM POST, Mar. 15, 2000, at 1.
235. CALABRESI, supra note 92, at 167-68 (discussing the claims that an
open assertion of judicial power will lead to the use of such power even when it
is generally unwelcomed). The availability of such legal powers is also likely to
encourage officials to argue that an increasing number of cases are "catastro-
phic" so as to enjoy the wider panoply of interrogation powers.
236. Kadish, supra note 27, at 356 ("[Clertain practices are so abhorrent
that seeking to control their use through law only magnifies their horror.").
Justice Brandeis's famous admonition in Olmstead v. United States is appro-
priate in this context: "Our Government is the potent, the omnipresent
teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example .... To
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Yet, if one rejects legalization of torture by legislation, she
should come to the same conclusion with respect to judicial pro-
ceedings that result in the issuance of a warrant. In both situa-
tions, the legal system indicates that torture may be lawfully
applied. Under my proposed model, on the other hand, insofar
as preventive interrogational torture exists, it does so outside
the ordinary legal system. It is kept separate and not allowed
to penetrate the "normal" legal system and contaminate it.
Judicial involvement in authorizing torture will carry sig-
nificant legitimating value for the government's actions.237 It
will also establish a pattern of legal precedents (at least in the
broad sense of the term). Analyzing the constitutionality of tor-
ture warrants, Dershowitz argues that the only constitutional
barriers against his proposal may be the Due Process Clauses
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 238 However, he ar-
gues that these clauses "are quite general and sufficiently
flexible to permit an argument that the only process 'due' a ter-
rorist suspected of refusing to disclose information necessary to
prevent a terrorist attack is the requirement of probable cause
and some degree of judicial supervision."239 Yet, Dershowitz's
reading of the Due Process Clauses, assuming arguendo that
one accepts it, is open to two systemic challenges.
First, there is the matter of Justice Jackson's famous warn-
ing in Korematsu:
240
[A] judicial construction of the due process clause that will sustain
this order is a far more subtle blow to liberty than the promulgation
of the order itself. A military order, however unconstitutional, is not
declare that in the administration of the criminal law the end justifies the
means... would bring terrible retribution." 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting).
237. See ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 29-31
(1962); Posner, supra note 34, at 8 ("[Rlequiring a warrant in cases of coercive
interrogation would operate merely to whitewash questionable practices by
persuading the naive that there was firm judicial control over such interroga-
tions.").
238. DERSHOWITZ, supra note 18, at 135.
239. Id. It is sentences like this one that are often picked up by proponents
of an absolute ban on torture as an example of the pernicious effects of condi-
tionality. Thus, for example, Dershowitz speaks of a "terrorist suspected of
withholding information necessary to avert a terrorist attack." But surely we
are still concerned with a "suspected terrorist"? Even if we have every reason
to believe that the individual undergoing interrogation was the one, for exam-
ple, who planted the bomb that ticks away in the mall and is about to explode,
the presumption of innocence (in the moral and legal sense, as distinguished
from "current harmlessness") still applies here. See supra note 66.
240. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
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apt to last longer than the military emergency .... But once a judicial
opinion rationalizes such an order to show that it conforms to the
Constitution, or rather rationalizes the Constitution to show that the
Constitution sanctions such an order, the Court for all time has vali-
dated the principle of racial discrimination in criminal procedure and
of transplanting American citizens. The principle then lies about like
a loaded weapon ready for the hand of any authority that can bring
forward a plausible claim of an urgent need . 4
Dershowitz responds by arguing that "[tiolerating an off-
the-book system of secret torture can also establish a danger-
ous precedent."242 The official disobedience model, however,
minimizes the problem of precedent. The extralegal nature of
the governmental action adds another layer of insulation
against the normalization of such a "dangerous precedent," and
its transformation into part of the ordinary legal system. "A
breach of the law, even a necessary one, that ought to be justi-
fied, can never destroy the law .... But an act legally done can
always be drawn into precedent."243 Although certain ex post
ratifications may work to change existing legal rules, norms,
and structures, transforming an extralegal, political precedent
241. Id. at 245-46 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
242. DERSHOWITZ, supra note 18, at 162.
243. Lucius Wilmerding, Jr., The President and the Law, 67 POL. SC. Q.
321, 329-30 (1952) (emphasis added). Wilmerding explains his statement
thus:
A breach of the law, even a necessary one, that ought to be justified,
can never destroy the law. It stands upon the records of Congress as
an exception out of the law to be transmitted to posterity "as a safe-
guard of the constitution, that in future times no evil might come of it,
from a precedent of the highest necessity, and most important service
to the country." But an act legally done can always be drawn into
precedent... [and] since "men by habit make irregular stretches of
power without discerning the consequence and extent of them," one
small wrong must lead to a greater one, and in the end force must be-
come the measure of law, discretion must degenerate into despotism.
Id. Eminent political philosophers have also issued warnings against the po-
tential pernicious effect of violating the law, even for a short time and in the
face of an exigency. See, e.g., JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF
GOVERNMENT, in TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT § 166 (Peter Laslett ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690) (arguing that any use of the prerogative
power creates a precedent for future exercises of such power by less benevolent
rulers and contending that "[ulpon this is founded that saying, That the
Reigns of good Princes have been always most dangerous to the Liberties of
their People"); NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI, THE DISCOURSES 195 (Bernard Crick
ed., Pelican Classics 1970) (1513-1517) ("Though [extralegal measures] may
do good at the time, the precedent thus established is bad, since it sanctions
the usage of dispensing with constitutional methods for a good purpose, and
thereby makes it possible, on some plausible pretext, to dispense with them for
a bad purpose.").
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into a legal one, such a shift cannot happen under my proposed
model without informed public participation and accountability
in the process.2 4 4
Second, the impact of judicial torture warrants, and the
loose interpretation of the Due Process Clauses that those judi-
cial decisions would require, may expand to other non-torture-
related issues. The "transsubstantive" nature of many constitu-
tional limitations, such as the Due Process Clauses-the fact
that they apply to "ordinary" criminals and to suspected terror-
ists-has two important implications in this context. 24 5 First,
judicial decisions made in the context of the war on terrorism
will also apply in the more general (and regular) context of
criminal law and procedure. Second, when judges decide "ordi-
nary" criminal cases, they will take into consideration the im-
246pact of their rulings on the fight against terrorism.
D. VISIBILITY
"Sunlight," said Justice Brandeis, was "the best disinfec-
tant. 47 Similarly, it is argued that rather than have torture
done "off the books and below the radar screen," the need to ob-
tain a judicial torture warrant makes the resort to interroga-
tional torture more visible and more amenable to public scru-
tiny and accountability. The decision whether to torture in any
particular case is not left in the hands of the interrogators who
may have a strong bias towards using such coercive techniques.
Clearly, having neutral judges examine the governmental
case for using torture, even in the preliminary sense that issu-
ing a warrant involves, adds a certain degree of accountability
and visibility to the process. The light of judicial inspection
penetrates the darkness of the interrogation chamber. How-
ever, it is not entirely clear how bright this light is actually go-
ing to be.
Decisions on whether to issue torture warrants, conducted
as ex parte proceedings, would have a very limited public visi-
bility.248 In fact, even in proceedings where both sides are pre-
244. See also infra notes 265-66 and accompanying text.
245. See Stuntz, supra note 110, at 2140-41.
246. Id. ("One cannot read Fourth Amendment cases from the 1980s with-
out sensing judicial attention to the pros and cons of the war on drugs--even
when the cases did not involve drug crime. Crack dealers were the most sali-
ent crime problem a dozen years ago; now, terrorists occupy that place.").
247. LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY 92 (1913).
248. Recognizing this difficulty, Levinson suggests that "all torture war-
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sent, visibility may be relatively low. In Israel, arguments
about the use of interrogational torture have been brought be-
fore the supreme court through petitions of individuals under-
going interrogation who sought to obtain a judicial injunction
that would prohibit the application of coercive interrogation
techniques. At least until the court's 1999 decision in Public
Committee Against Torture in Israel v. The State of Israel ,249 the
vast majority of the court's decisions in those petitions have
been extremely brief, often including no more than a few lines
and the ultimate conclusion.25 °
More significantly, the sensitive nature of governmental
intrusion, the intelligence-sensitive nature of the information
relied on to justify that intrusion, and the severity of the gov-
ernmental interests and the threats that are involved in the
catastrophic case are likely to lead to the throwing of a curtain
of secrecy over the proceedings." 1 Indeed, Dershowitz himself
recognized this possibility when he wrote, back in 1989, that
Even if the mere public disclosure of the problem would be dangerous
to the security of the state ... there are secret options which are far
more democratic than [the ones adopted by the Landau Commission].
Among these are... judicial panels authorized to approve special
212measures under extraordinary circumstances.
Consider two examples from different, though related, con-
texts, where despite judicial monitoring and supervision, se-
crecy rather than visibility has triumphed.
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the
United States government has increasingly turned to immigra-
tion law in furthering the fight against terrorism. 53 As David
rants should be public, with written opinions that can be subjected to analysis"
and that "the person whom the state proposes to torture should be in the pres-
ence of the judge, so that the judge can take no refuge in abstraction." Levin-
son, supra note 10, at 2048. However, for reasons explained in the text, I be-
lieve that neither proposal is likely to be adopted in practice.
249. H.C. 5100/94, 53(4) P.D. 817.
250. Mordechai Kremnitzer & Reem Segev, The Application of Force in the
Course of GSS Interrogations-A Lesser Evil?, 4 MISHPAT U'MIMSHAL 667,
671-79 (1998).
251. See Posner, supra note 34, at 8, stating:
[I]t is probably inevitable that in national-security cases the judicial
officers authorized to issue such warrants will be chosen in part for
their sensitivity to security concerns. Moreover, the warrants and the
affidavits supporting them, as well as the judges' reasons for granting
the warrants, would be likely to remain secret.
252. Dershowitz, supra note 22, at 198.
253. See, e.g., COLE, supra note 88, at 22-35 (discussing the use by the Jus-
tice Department of immigration law for pretextual mass preventive deten-
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Cole observes, "[firom the beginning, the Justice Department
determined that secrecy was critical to its preventive detention
campaign."254 That need for secrecy found its most startling ex-
pression in the decision to conduct secret hearings in accor-
dance with the instructions contained in the "Creppy memo-
randum," named after Chief Immigration Judge Michael
Creppy. 55 According to the Creppy memorandum, all immigra-
tion cases designated as of "special interest" to the September
11 investigation are to be conducted in secret. Indeed, such
cases are not even to be listed on the docket, and immigration
judges hearing such cases were instructed "to refuse to confirm
or deny that the cases existed."256
Another example is the establishment of the special For-
eign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) under the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978.257 Composed of
eleven federal district judges, designated by the Chief Justice,258
FISC meets in secret and is authorized to issue ex ante surveil-
lance orders, which may include search warrants, 259 based on
probable cause that the target of the search is "a foreign power
or an agent of a foreign power."260 Proceedings before FISC are
conducted as closed, ex parte hearings. 261 The combined effect of
tions).
254. Id. at 26.
255. Id.
256. Id.; see also Ctr. for Nat. Sec. Studies v. United States Dept. of Jus-
tice, 331 F.3d 918 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d
681 (6th Cir. 2002); N. Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198 (3d
Cir. 2002).
257. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1862 (2000).
258. Concerns about the independence of FISC judges have been raised in
light of the fact that they are appointed for a seven-year term, but their desig-
nation and appointment may be revoked during that term. See United States
v. Cavanagh, 807 F.2d 787, 792 (9th Cir. 1987) (rejecting the claim); see also
Comment, Constitutional Law-Fourth Amendment-Separation of Powers-
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review Holds That Prosecutors May
Spy on American Agents of Foreign Powers Without a Warrant-In re Sealed
Case, 310 F.3d 717 (Foreign Int. Surv. Ct. Rev. 2002), 116 HARv. L. REV. 2246,
2252-53 (2003) (expressing concern about the institutional integrity of FISC).
259. See, e.g., Daniel J. Malooly, Note, Physical Searches Under FISA: A
Constitutional Analysis, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 411, 412-16 (1998).
260. 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a).
261. "In a locked, windowless room with walls of corrugated steel, in a re-
stricted area of a Justice Department building in Washington, sits the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC). Conducting proceedings completely
hidden from the public.. ." Nola K. Breglio, Note, Leaving FISA Behind: The
Need to Return to Warrantless Foreign Intelligence Surveillance, 113 YALE L.J.
179, 179 (2003).
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secrecy and the courts' general proclivity to defer to the execu-
tive in matters of national security is clearly demonstrated by
FISC's record. For example, in 2002, 1228 applications were
made to FISC for electronic surveillance and physical searches.
All, without exception, have been approved by the court.262 In
over twenty-five years, FISC has approved all but less than a
handful of applications.263
The possibility of resorting to preventive interrogational
torture presents us with tragic moral, social, political, and legal
choices. It is tempting to avoid having to grapple with those.
Even the mere talk about torture is disconcerting. We would
rather prefer to believe that we, as a society, are above moral
reproach. 26 ' The semblance of effective judicial control over the
use of torture, through the mechanism of torture warrants, and
the maintenance of a veneer of legal normality, would allow the
public to live in a fool's paradise, conveniently ignoring crude
realities. Court-conferred legitimacy over interrogational tor-
ture would make it easier to dispose of the need for a meaning-
ful, and painful, public soul searching.265
262. Attorney General, 2002 Annual Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
Report to Congress (Apr. 29, 2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/
04foia/readingrooms/2002fisa-ltr.pdf.
263. There is another respect in which the experience under FISC should
give supporters of torture warrants a reason to be cautious. Dershowitz argues
that use of torture warrants would result in better protection of the rights of
suspects, among other things, because coercive interrogational techniques will
only be used in order to extract information that is critical to prevent further
terrorist attacks and, in return, such information will not be admitted into
evidence in any future criminal trial against that suspect. DERSHOWITZ, supra
note 18, at 159; see also Zuckerman, supra note 32, at 364-65. However, it
should be noted that a FISA warrant does permit a search whose fruits may be
used in subsequent criminal proceedings. See Yoo, supra note 216, at 443.
264. See, e.g., Lahav, supra note 7, at 538 ('The complacence of the entire
family in hiding the reality is one of the gravest consequences of terrorism and
counterterrorism. People develop a dependence upon the security forces, a
tendency to defer to their judgment, and above all, a willingness to suppress
the unpleasant. It is better not to know."); Levinson, supra note 10, at 2042-43
(discussing a "don't ask, don't tell" policy with respect to using torture in inter-
rogations).
265. As George Alexander explains,
In evaluating the role of courts in emergencies it is important to con-
sider not only the fact that bad decisions such as Korematsu may in-
fest law long after the emergency has passed, but also the fact that
they provide an imprimatur for military-executive decisions which
might otherwise draw more political disfavor. The absence of court
approval, as for example during the war in Vietnam, allows the ques-
tions of legitimacy full sway in public discussion.
George J. Alexander, The Illusory Protection of Human Rights by National
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It is against this background of limited judicial visibility
with no, or at best partial, public transparency and delibera-
tion, that one ought to measure and assess the requirement of
ex post public ratification under the official disobedience model.
The need for ex post ratification promotes greater public ac-
countability. It also promotes an open debate about the princi-
ples and rules that are involved in preventive interrogational
torture, as well as over their particular applications in specific
cases. It leaves no choice but for both government officials and
the public to take a stand on these matters and then be politi-
cally, legally, and morally responsible for it.266
E. ACCOUNTABILITY
There is another sense in which the model of official dis-
obedience promotes greater accountability than the torture
warrants proposal.
As noted above, the official disobedience model imposes a
significant burden on state agents who must act, sometimes ex-
tralegally, without the benefit of legal preapproval of their ac-
tions by the courts or the legislature. Officials must put them-
selves in the line of fire and act at their own peril. If they
believe that the stakes are so high as to merit extralegal action,
they may take such action and hope to be able to convince the
public to see things their way. This awesome burden militates
against a "rush to torture." At the same time, the need to ob-
tain ex post ratification facilitates greater accountability by the
officials who must submit their actions to public scrutiny.
The torture warrant model shifts the burden and the risk
to the courts. Rather than having to act at their own peril, pub-
lic officials can ask for a judicial torture warrant. Once such a
warrant is issued, and as long as the official stays within the
limitations set therein, the actor bears practically no legal risk
related to her actions. Thus, the ex post review process places
stronger disincentives on state agents to resort to torture in the
first place and hence "reduce[s] the use of torture to the small-
est amount and degree possible."267 By shifting the burden of
approving interrogational torture from officials to the courts,
rather than insisting on official and public responsibility, the
torture warrant model may further "lower the quality of the
Courts During Periods of Emergency, 5 HUM. RTS. L.J. 1, 26-27 (1984).
266. Gross, supra note 94, at 1126-30.
267. DERSHOWITZ, supra note 18, at 141.
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other departments' performance by denuding them of the dig-
nity and burden of their own responsibility."
268
F. INSTITUTIONALIZATION
Recognizing the possibility of ex post ratification is not the
same as authorizing the use of preventive interrogational tor-
ture ex ante. Unlike the latter, ex post ratification serves, at
most, as an ad hoc, individualized defense to specific state
agents against civil or criminal charges in particular cases. It
cannot serve as a general, institutional, conduct-guiding rule to
be relied upon ex ante."' Subsequent ratification may only be
available to individual public officials after the fact, and thus,
does not set a priori guidelines for action.270
The individualized nature of subsequent ratification is sig-
nificant for yet another reason. Institutionalizing interroga-
tional torture reinforces-for example, by conferring imprima-
tur of legality and legitimacy-social, hierarchical structures
that authorize individuals, namely the interrogators, to act vio-
lently. As Robert Cover warned in his aptly named Violence
and the Word, "[p]ersons who act within social organizations
that exercise authority act violently without experiencing the
normal inhibitions or the normal degree of inhibition which
regulates the behavior of those who act autonomously."271 In
such circumstances it is much more likely that resort will be
made to violence in interrogations. On the other hand, the need
to act extralegally and hope for subsequent ratification focuses
on individual behavior. It is not amenable to institutionaliza-
tion. It is left up to the individual interrogator to determine
whether to use violence in any given case. Acting at her own
peril, the interrogator acts much more as an autonomous moral
agent than as an agent for the hierarchical institution which
she serves.
268. BICKEL, supra note 237, at 24.
269. H.C. 5100/94, Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. The State of
Israel, 53(4) P.D. 817, at paras. 36-37; Kadish, supra note 27, at 352; Krem-
nitzer, supra note 39, at 237-43; Kremnitzer & Segev, supra note 250, at 694,
705.
270. See, e.g., Kadish, supra note 27, at 347 ('[Wihile a person may justi-
fiably use cruel methods to obtain information in certain extraordinary situa-
tions, a state may not justifiably so provide in its law, but must rather main-
tain a flat and unqualified ban against such measures.").
271. Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1615
(1986).
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Low-ranking officials may seek the guidance of, and ap-
proval by, their superiors before acting extralegally if only in
order to protect the former against future charges and allega-
tions. Yet, if it takes place, such seeking of approval may carry
its own benefits. First, it would create additional opportunities
to deliberate and review the question of using torture in the
particular case. Second, Dershowitz's torture warrant proposal
assumes that courts must be involved in the process to monitor,
supervise, and regulate the use of interrogational torture. Yet,
these goals may also be obtained effectively by a system of "cen-
tering responsibility in the hands of those [high-ranking] police
officers who are expected to be the most qualified (because they
have the most experience) and who have the most to lose (be-
cause of the threat of demotion) if a serious error is made."272
Thus, Richard Frase suggests that "contemporaneous police
supervision [may] be stricter than after-the-fact supervision by
judges, who may be tempted to defer to police expertise."273 Yet,
as argued above, judicial deference to police is also going to be
especially strong in the context of issuing ex ante torture war-
rants. Internal high-ranking authorization within the relevant
investigatory bodies may offer a possibility of supervision while
keeping public officials accountable for their actions . Under
such a centralized system, decisions to employ interrogational
torture would only be taken by certain high-ranking officers
who may be farther removed from the scene than individual in-
terrogators.
In 1987, Justice Brennan made the following observation:
Prolonged and sustained exposure to the asserted security claims may
be the only way in which a country can gain both the discipline neces-
sary to examine asserted security risks critically and the expertise
necessary to distinguish the bona fide from the bogus .... In this re-
spect, it may well be Israel, not the United States, that provides the
best hope for building a jurisprudence that can protect civil liberties
against the demands of national security.
275
272. Richard Frase, Comparative Criminal Justice as a Guide to American
Law Reform: How Do the French Do It, How Can We Find Out, and Why
Should We Care?, 78 CAL. L. REV. 539, 555-56 (1990) (noting that the French
Code of Criminal Procedure requires that especially sensitive investigations be
authorized by high-ranking officials or supervisors within the police hierar-
chy).
273. Id. at 556.
274. Id. (suggesting that police supervision represents a useful intermedi-
ate approach between judicial control and no control).
275. William J. Brennan, Jr., The Quest To Develop a Jurisprudence of
Civil Liberties in Times of Security Crises, 18 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 11, 18-20
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While this may take the case a bit too far, it certainly is in-
teresting to note that the Israeli Supreme Court-which has
been grappling with the tragic choices presented in this Article
far longer than any other judicial institution--decided in 1999
to reject the ex ante approach and adopt a position that focused
on ex post, individualized review. In Public Committee Against
Torture in Israel v. The State of Israel,276 the Israeli Supreme
Court, sitting as High Court of Justice, ruled that GSS investi-
gators enjoyed the same interrogation powers that were avail-
able to police officers and, by the same token, were subject to
the same restrictions and limitations that applied to police in-
vestigations, flowing from the requirement that an interroga-
tion be fair and reasonable. 7 The court proceeded to rule that
certain specific interrogation methods applied by the GSS were
prohibited under Israeli law.278 Arguing before the court, the
state contended that authorization for such otherwise imper-
missible methods of interrogation could be derived from the de-
fense of "necessity." 79 That argument was squarely rejected by
the court, holding that "general directives governing the use of
physical means during interrogations must be rooted in an au-
thorization prescribed by law and not in defenses to criminal
liability. The principle of 'necessity' cannot serve as a basis of
authority."20 At the same time, the court indicated its willing-
ness to presume that if a GSS investigator-who had applied
physical interrogation methods for the purpose of saving hu-
man life-was criminally indicted, the "necessity defense"
would likely be open to her "in the appropriate circum-
stances."28' Thus, while no ex ante legal authorization exists
(1988).
276. H.C. 5100/94, 53(4) P.D. 817.
277. Id. paras. 20, 32.
278. Id. paras. 24-31.
279. Id. para. 33.
280. Id. para. 37.
281. Id. para. 34. While that was not the issue before the court in that case,
id. para. 35, the court went on to suggest that,
[pirovided the conditions of the [necessity] defense are met by the cir-
cumstances of the case, the investigator may find refuge under its
wings. Just as the existence of the "necessity defense" does not bestow
authority, the lack of authority does not negate the applicability of
the necessity defense or of other defenses from criminal liability. The
Attorney-General can establish guidelines regarding circumstances in
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under Israeli law for the use of interrogational torture (and,
consequently, there is no room for judicial orders authorizing
such use), the court was willing to accept the possibility that
"the most lawless of legal doctrines" 82 would serve as an after-
the-fact defense to individual GSS investigators who applied
such methods of interrogations in catastrophic cases.28
VI. TALKING ABOUT TORTURE
The previous parts set out the main features of my ap-
proach to the conundrum posed by preventive interrogational
torture. My proposed solution is based on the twin concepts of
pragmatic absolutism and official disobedience. I support an
absolute legal ban on torture while simultaneously suggesting
that in catastrophic cases public officials may choose to act out-
side the legal order, at times even violate the otherwise en-
trenched absolute prohibition on torture.
Some may charge me with trying to have my cake and eat
it too, that is, supporting an absolute legal ban on torture pre-
cisely on the ground that it will not function as absolute in real
life. Perhaps this is true. Guido Calabresi notes that subter-
fuges often accompany tragic choices. "We look for solutions
which seek to cover the difficulty and thereby permit us to as-
sert that we are cleaving to both beliefs in conflict."284 To be
sure, my proposal attempts to cling to both sets of values in-
volved in assessing torture in general, and preventive interro-
gational torture in particular. However, rather than cover up
the difficulty I seek to expose it and ensure that it is dealt with
in as transparent, open, and public manner as possible.285 This
desire for visibility, accountability, openness, candor, and re-
sponsibility is shared by proponents of ex ante torture warrants
and of ex post public ratification alike.
But is public and open debate about torture, in and of it-
self, desirable? Or is it better to treat the absolute ban on tor-
282. Dershowitz, supra note 22, at 196.
283. H.C. 5100/94, Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. The State of
Israel, 53(4) P.D. 817, at para. 34 ("[W]e are prepared to accept-although this
matter is ... contentious-that the 'necessity defense' can arise in instances of
'ticking bombs'...."). The court held that the necessity defense may be avail-
able to GSS investigators "either in the choice made by the Attorney-General
in deciding whether to prosecute, or according to the discretion of the court if
criminal charges are brought." Id. para. 40.
284. GUIDO CALABRESI, IDEALS, BELIEFS, ATTITUDES, AND THE LAW 88
(1985).
285. CALABRESI, supra note 92, at 178-81.
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ture as axiomatic and avoid attempts to prove its desirability or
usefulness? Does merely engaging in debate on torture reflect
"loose professionalism"?
2 86
William Twining once noted (but rejected) the argument
that "philosophical analysis of the problem may provide am-
munition which could be used or abused by those who seek to
justify actions which reflective and reasonable men would con-
demn without qualification."28 7 Henry Shue asked similarly, "if
practically everyone is opposed to all torture, why bring it up,
start people thinking about it, and risk weakening the inhibi-
tions against what is clearly a terrible business?"
288
Yet, the alternative to no open debate over the use of tor-
ture (or, indeed, to discussion that merely replicates the man-
tra that torture is absolutely prohibited) is not the disappear-
ance of the practice of torture. While we abhor the detailed
medieval codes and procedures on torture, we also ought to rec-
ognize that the practice remains. By refusing to discuss torture,
we do not make it go away; we drive it underground.289 More-
over, by refusing to acknowledge that the notion of torture is
more complex than many supporters of the "torture-is-banned-
and-that-is-all-there-is-to-it" approach would have us believe,
we run the risk of having the general public perceive the legal
system as either utopian or hypocritical. After all, most of us
believe that most, if not all, government agents, when faced
with a genuinely catastrophic case, are likely to resort to what-
ever means they can wield-including preventive interroga-
tional torture-to overcome the particular grave danger that is
involved. And I believe that most of us hope they will do so.
286. Weisberg, supra note 76 (manuscript at 2) (describing "loose profes-
sionalism" as "the phenomenon of legal discourse that slips dangerously to-
wards the known-to-be-wrong").
287. William Twining, Torture and Philosophy, in ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY
143 (1978).
288. Shue, supra note 17, at 124. Although Shue referred to such discus-
sions as opening Pandora's Box, such fears obviously did not prevent either
Twining or Shue from writing valuable contributions to the debate. See Nagel,
supra note 34, at 8 (explaining that "[i]f it is not allowable to do certain
things.., then no argument about what will happen if one doesn't do them
can show that doing them would be all right" because "absolutism ... means
that we cannot deliberate on whether such measures are justified by the fact
that they will avert still greater evils"); Weisberg, supra note 76 (manuscript
at 3) ("[Tlhe lessons of history are clear in demonstrating
that.., rationalizations [of torture] not only help the practice thrive but often
provide ... the main reasons for its baleful success.").
289. EvANS & MORGAN, supra note 11, at 55-60.
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The prohibition on torture and the catastrophic case pre-
sent us with truly tragic choices. Public officials (and, under my
proposal, members of the general public) must choose between
several fundamental social values, such as the right to be free
from torture and the right to life.290 We may as well make such
choices in as informed a manner as possible, taking into ac-
count the widest panoply of relevant moral and legal considera-
tions.
290. GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBIrr, TRAGIC CHOICES 17 (1978) ("[I]t
is the values accepted by a society as fundamental that mark some choices as
tragic.").
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